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169 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
169 lines
10 KiB
Markdown
# Wallet keyfile recovery proof
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**Status: source and synthetic tests only. This helper has not been installed on or run against
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`deb`, and this document does not authorize a host mutation or a production ceremony.**
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This runbook covers one deliberately narrow question: can an audited encrypted wallet snapshot and
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the password already exposed in the matching legacy wallet-RPC process open offline and reproduce
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the exact public address currently returned by that process? The fixed helper is
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`scripts/deploy/wallet-keyfile-recovery-proof.py`.
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The answer is emitted as exactly one status line:
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```text
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result=passed
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```
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or:
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```text
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result=refused
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```
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There is intentionally no diagnostic mode. Never add shell tracing, a debugger, `strace`, command
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line capture, wallet-RPC response logging, or exception rendering to investigate a refusal. Those
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would defeat the secret-handling boundary this proof is meant to preserve.
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## What a pass means
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A pass establishes all of the following for the selected profile at that moment:
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- the expected legacy systemd unit has a stable MainPID, executable, UID/GID, cgroup, listener,
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network flag, RPC port, and exact `--wallet-file` argument;
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- its already-exposed inline wallet password could be copied from the NUL-delimited process command
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line without rendering it;
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- both fixed, root-only pre-production snapshot files were real, single-link regular files with the
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audited metadata and were copied byte-for-byte into a newly created private `/run` directory;
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- the matching wallet-RPC executable opened that copied pair offline on the fixed loopback proof
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port as the exact legacy UID/GID, with an empty supplementary-group list, using a password file and
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an ephemeral Digest credential;
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- the proof endpoint rejected an unauthenticated request with HTTP 401, accepted an authenticated
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`get_address` request with HTTP 200, returned an address shaped for the expected network, and that
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address exactly equalled the current live address;
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- that restored wallet signed one fixed, non-secret proof message and its own wallet-RPC verified the
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signature as a spend-key signature (or, for the legacy response shape, verified the default
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spend-key signature), so a watch-only keyfile cannot pass; and
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- the candidate stopped, its listener disappeared, and only the exact ephemeral files and directory
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were securely cleaned up.
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The helper does not stop, start, restart, reload, reconfigure, or write to a live unit or live wallet.
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The proof candidate is offline; it cannot refresh, submit transactions, or contact a daemon.
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## What a pass does not mean
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This is **not seed custody** and it is **not an off-host disaster-recovery test**. In particular, a
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pass does not establish:
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- that a mnemonic or seed has ever been recorded, is readable, is complete, or is held by the right
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custodians;
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- that the encrypted keyfile, its password, or a seed exists independently off this host—the password
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used here comes only from the already-running process, not from an independent custody source;
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- that Restic media, repository credentials, retention, or an actual off-host restore path works;
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- that a restore can rescan chain history, discover the expected balance, or spend funds;
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- that daemon, database, application, DNS, proxy, Nebula, or fleet recovery works; or
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- that payouts, wagering, mainnet money movement, or a production release is authorized.
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Do not query, display, export, hash, or automate retrieval of a mnemonic to fill this gap. Seed
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custody requires a separate human-controlled inventory and an off-host restore drill with an agreed
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handling ceremony. Until that evidence exists, record seed custody and off-host recovery as
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**unproven**, even if this helper passes.
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## Fixed audited profiles
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No path, unit, binary, port, user, or RPC method is accepted from the caller. The only accepted
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profile names are `monero-stagenet` and `wownero-mainnet`.
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| Profile | Fixed legacy identity | Fixed snapshots | Private proof target |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| `monero-stagenet` | `monero-wallet-rpc.service`, `jw:jw`, `/usr/bin/monero-wallet-rpc`, wallet `/home/jw/Programs/monero-x86_64-linux-gnu-v0.18.4.4/test`, `127.0.0.1:38083`, `--stagenet` | `/var/backups/wowngeon/wallets/monero-stagenet-preprod-20260721T1140Z.wallet` and `/var/backups/wowngeon/wallets/monero-stagenet-preprod-20260721T1140Z.keys` | outer `/run/wowngeon-wallet-keyfile-proof-monero-stagenet`, inner `candidate`, `127.0.0.1:39084` |
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| `wownero-mainnet` | `wownero-wallet-rpc.service`, `jw:jw`, `/usr/bin/wownero-wallet-rpc`, wallet `/home/jw/Programs/wow-11.3.0/game`, audited legacy listener `0.0.0.0:34570` | `/var/backups/wowngeon/wallets/wownero-mainnet-preprod-20260721T1140Z.wallet` and `/var/backups/wowngeon/wallets/wownero-mainnet-preprod-20260721T1140Z.keys` | outer `/run/wowngeon-wallet-keyfile-proof-wownero-mainnet`, inner `candidate`, `127.0.0.1:39570` |
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The live equality observations are unauthenticated because the legacy sources are. Monero is
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loopback-only; Wownero's wildcard listener is an insecure legacy source contained by the host
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firewall, not a state this proof endorses. `current_live_address` makes one read-only public-address
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observation solely for equality; a match is **not** an RPC-hardening or network-security pass. The
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helper neither changes nor resolves the wildcard/unauthenticated service. Its proof candidate always
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binds loopback and requires an ephemeral Digest credential.
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Each fixed proof path is a root-owned outer directory, `root:jw` mode `0710`, which prevents the
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candidate identity from listing or writing its parent. Root builds the inner `candidate` subtree and
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files before publishing only that subtree as `jw:jw` mode `0700` with `0600` files. Immediately before
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exec, the child clears supplementary groups, sets all real/effective/saved GIDs and UIDs to `jw:jw`,
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clears retained capabilities, then reapplies no-dump, no-new-privileges, and zero-core limits. The
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parent verifies empty inheritable/permitted/effective/ambient capability sets. Wallet-RPC never runs
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as root.
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The audited snapshot directory is `/var/backups/wowngeon/wallets`, `root:root` mode `0700`; each
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snapshot is `root:root` mode `0600` with one link. Its parent is `/var/backups/wowngeon`,
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`root:postgres` mode `0710`. Any deviation refuses the proof.
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## Review and synthetic verification
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Before any future host ceremony, review the helper and run the disposable fixture locally:
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```bash
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python3 -m py_compile scripts/deploy/wallet-keyfile-recovery-proof.py \
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scripts/deploy/wallet-keyfile-recovery-fixture-test.py
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python3 scripts/deploy/wallet-keyfile-recovery-fixture-test.py
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```
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The fixture uses only generated temporary files and synthetic credentials. It covers exact argument
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selection and wiping, indirect or duplicate password refusal, network mismatch, link and metadata
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failures, source mutation during copy, byte equality, cleanup containment, Digest authentication
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shape, candidate config shape, privilege dropping, fixed-message spend signing/verification,
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watch-only refusal, and proof-port collision. It never opens a real wallet.
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Review must also confirm that the executable still contains only read-only `systemctl is-active` and
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`systemctl show` calls; only the `get_address`, `sign`, and `verify` wallet RPC methods; no
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caller-controlled paths, ports, or messages; and only the two status strings as runtime output. The
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address and signature are never output or retained as ceremony evidence.
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## Future authorized ceremony
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Run Monero stagenet first. Wownero mainnet remains an offline keyfile-open proof only and must not be
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treated as approval to enable payouts or submit a transaction.
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Only after a reviewed revision is explicitly approved for installation should an operator install
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that exact file to a root-owned, non-writable path such as
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`/usr/local/sbin/wowngeon-wallet-keyfile-recovery-proof` with owner `root:root` and mode `0700`.
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Do not run it from a mutable checkout. Record the reviewed source revision, but do not record wallet
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bytes, addresses, passwords, command lines, Digest material, wallet-derived hashes, or RPC bodies.
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Before each profile:
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1. Confirm no debugger, tracing wrapper, shell xtrace, terminal recorder, or broad process collector
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will observe the root helper.
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2. Confirm the expected proof port is not reserved for another operation and the exact fixed `/run`
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proof directory does not exist.
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3. Confirm the legacy unit is expected to remain online and unchanged for the short proof window.
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4. Invoke the installed helper as root with exactly one fixed profile argument and capture only its
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one-line status.
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The future invocations are:
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```bash
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sudo /usr/local/sbin/wowngeon-wallet-keyfile-recovery-proof monero-stagenet
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sudo /usr/local/sbin/wowngeon-wallet-keyfile-recovery-proof wownero-mainnet
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```
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These commands are examples for a later authorized ceremony, not evidence they have been run.
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After each invocation, verify only that its fixed proof port is closed and its fixed proof directory
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is absent. A pass is invalid if cleanup did not complete; the helper reports refusal in that case.
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## Refusal or interrupted execution
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`result=refused` is intentionally non-diagnostic. Do not weaken the helper or print an exception to
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learn why. Review the fixed-path metadata, expected unit state, listener ownership, port availability,
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and synthetic suite through non-secret checks, then arrange a new reviewed ceremony.
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If a fixed proof directory remains after interruption, **do not blindly remove it**. Treat it as
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potentially containing wallet material. First establish through metadata-only checks that no proof
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wallet-RPC process or proof-port listener remains, keep the incident off shared logs, and have an
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authorized operator review cleanup of that exact path. Never use a recursive command against `/run`
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or a variable/glob target.
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The next independent backup milestone is a human-approved seed-custody inventory followed by a
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restore from genuinely off-host media into an isolated environment. That is the evidence needed to
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answer “do we have recoverable wallet seeds?”; this helper deliberately cannot answer it.
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