feat(auth): NIP-98 nostr sign-in for Smirk; fix SHA256 fallback + /status BOLA

Adds schnorr (BIP-340) NIP-98 verification (kind 27235) as the preferred Smirk login, with the legacy Ed25519 wallet-message path kept as a feature-detected fallback for wallets without signNostrEvent. New src/utils/nip98.js verifies securely: rebuilds a clean event, independently recomputes getEventHash and compares to event.id (defeats nostr-tools' verify-memo footgun), then schnorr-verifies; enforces kind, created_at freshness, and exactly-one u/method/challenge tags bound to the server nonce.

auth.js: /verify branches on body.event (NIP-98) vs {publicKey,signature,challenge} (legacy). Challenge consume is now atomic single-use (UPDATE ... WHERE used=FALSE AND expires_at>NOW() RETURNING) before verification. Removed the deprecated SHA256(challenge) pre-hash fallback (past its removal date). /status is now session-gated (X-Session-Token vs users.anon_token; 401/403 on mismatch) — closes the unauthenticated per-socketId disclosure. Client smirkAuth.js: feature-detects signNostrEvent, signs the NIP-98 event, falls back to legacy; checkStatus() now sends the session token.

Adds nostr-tools ^2.23.9 (works under CJS in prod; test loader falls back to its self-contained bundle under Jest). New adversarial suite test/smirkNip98_ultra.test.js (13 tests: tamper/expiry/wrong-tag/bad-sig/memo-bypass/replay). Suite 47/330 green.
This commit is contained in:
jwinterm
2026-07-09 22:19:30 -04:00
parent 71ce16a384
commit d0d327f3ca
6 changed files with 851 additions and 103 deletions
+123 -32
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,20 @@ const SmirkAuth = {
_walletAddress: null,
/**
* Main login flow
* Detect whether the connected Smirk wallet supports NIP-98 (nostr) signing.
*/
_supportsNip98() {
return typeof window.smirk?.signNostrEvent === 'function' &&
typeof window.smirk?.getNostrPublicKey === 'function';
},
/**
* Main login flow.
*
* Prefers NIP-98 (nostr kind:27235 HTTP auth event) when the wallet
* advertises the capability, and gracefully falls back to the legacy
* Ed25519 challenge-signing path otherwise (or if NIP-98 signing fails
* mid-flow).
*/
async login() {
if (!this.isAvailable()) {
@@ -54,7 +67,105 @@ const SmirkAuth = {
const { challenge } = await challengeRes.json();
// Step 2: Connect to Smirk extension
// Step 2: Feature-detect NIP-98 capability and verify with the backend.
let verifyData;
let provenPublicKey = null;
if (this._supportsNip98()) {
try {
const result = await this._verifyNip98(socketId, challenge);
verifyData = result.verifyData;
provenPublicKey = result.pubkey;
} catch (nip98Err) {
// Graceful fallback: if NIP-98 signing/verification fails
// (wallet threw, lacks the method mid-flow, etc.) fall back to
// the legacy path so login still works.
console.warn('Smirk NIP-98 auth failed, falling back to legacy:', nip98Err && nip98Err.message);
const result = await this._verifyLegacy(socketId, challenge);
verifyData = result.verifyData;
provenPublicKey = result.pubkey;
}
} else {
const result = await this._verifyLegacy(socketId, challenge);
verifyData = result.verifyData;
provenPublicKey = result.pubkey;
}
// Step 3: Get wallet addresses and auto-set payout address
// Note: the proven public key is a pubkey (hex), NOT an address.
// We need to call getAddresses() to get the actual WOW address.
let walletAddress = null;
try {
const addresses = await window.smirk.getAddresses();
if (addresses && addresses.wow && window.socket) {
window.socket.emit('address:update', { address: addresses.wow });
walletAddress = addresses.wow;
console.log('Smirk WOW address set:', addresses.wow.substring(0, 20) + '...');
}
} catch (addrErr) {
console.warn('Could not get Smirk addresses:', addrErr.message);
// Fall back - user will need to manually enter address
}
// Update internal state
this._isLinked = true;
this._walletAddress = walletAddress;
this._publicKey = provenPublicKey;
return {
success: true,
linked: verifyData.linked,
address: walletAddress
};
},
/**
* NIP-98 auth path: build a kind:27235 nostr event, sign it with the
* Smirk wallet, and POST { socketId, event } to /verify.
*
* @returns {Promise<{verifyData: object, pubkey: string|null}>}
*/
async _verifyNip98(socketId, challenge) {
// Build the NIP-98 HTTP auth event. The wallet fills in pubkey/id/sig.
const evt = {
kind: 27235,
created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
content: '',
tags: [
['u', new URL('/api/auth/smirk/verify', window.location.origin).href],
['method', 'POST'],
['challenge', challenge]
]
};
const signed = await window.smirk.signNostrEvent(evt);
if (!signed || typeof signed !== 'object') {
throw new Error('Smirk wallet did not return a signed nostr event');
}
const verifyRes = await fetch('/api/auth/smirk/verify', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ socketId, event: signed })
});
if (!verifyRes.ok) {
const error = await verifyRes.json().catch(() => ({}));
throw new Error(error.message || 'NIP-98 verification failed');
}
const verifyData = await verifyRes.json();
return { verifyData, pubkey: signed.pubkey || null };
},
/**
* Legacy Ed25519 auth path: connect, sign the challenge string, and POST
* { socketId, challenge, publicKey, signature } to /verify.
*
* @returns {Promise<{verifyData: object, pubkey: string|null}>}
*/
async _verifyLegacy(socketId, challenge) {
// Connect to Smirk extension
let keys;
try {
keys = await window.smirk.connect();
@@ -66,7 +177,7 @@ const SmirkAuth = {
throw new Error('Smirk wallet did not return WOW public key');
}
// Step 3: Sign the challenge
// Sign the challenge
let signResult;
try {
signResult = await window.smirk.signMessage(challenge);
@@ -80,7 +191,7 @@ const SmirkAuth = {
throw new Error('WOW signature not found in Smirk response');
}
// Step 4: Verify signature with backend
// Verify signature with backend
const verifyRes = await fetch('/api/auth/smirk/verify', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
@@ -98,33 +209,7 @@ const SmirkAuth = {
}
const verifyData = await verifyRes.json();
// Step 5: Get wallet addresses and auto-set payout address
// Note: keys.wow is a public key (hex), NOT an address
// We need to call getAddresses() to get the actual WOW address
let walletAddress = null;
try {
const addresses = await window.smirk.getAddresses();
if (addresses && addresses.wow && window.socket) {
window.socket.emit('address:update', { address: addresses.wow });
walletAddress = addresses.wow;
console.log('Smirk WOW address set:', addresses.wow.substring(0, 20) + '...');
}
} catch (addrErr) {
console.warn('Could not get Smirk addresses:', addrErr.message);
// Fall back - user will need to manually enter address
}
// Update internal state
this._isLinked = true;
this._walletAddress = walletAddress;
this._publicKey = wowSig.publicKey;
return {
success: true,
linked: verifyData.linked,
address: walletAddress
};
return { verifyData, pubkey: wowSig.publicKey };
},
/**
@@ -136,7 +221,13 @@ const SmirkAuth = {
}
try {
const res = await fetch(`/api/auth/smirk/status?socketId=${encodeURIComponent(window.socket.id)}`);
// /status is session-gated (BOLA fix) — send the session token so a linked user
// is recognised; without it the endpoint returns 401 and we fall through to unlinked.
var token = '';
try { token = localStorage.getItem('wownerogue_token') || ''; } catch (_) { token = ''; }
const res = await fetch(`/api/auth/smirk/status?socketId=${encodeURIComponent(window.socket.id)}`, {
headers: token ? { 'X-Session-Token': token } : {}
});
if (res.ok) {
const data = await res.json();
this._isLinked = data.linked;
+105
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
"dotenv": "^16.0.3",
"express": "^4.21.3",
"node-pg-migrate": "^8.0.4",
"nostr-tools": "^2.23.9",
"pg": "^8.15.5",
"qrcode": "^1.5.3",
"resend": "^4.0.0",
@@ -1013,6 +1014,45 @@
"@jridgewell/sourcemap-codec": "^1.4.14"
}
},
"node_modules/@noble/ciphers": {
"version": "2.1.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@noble/ciphers/-/ciphers-2.1.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-bysYuiVfhxNJuldNXlFEitTVdNnYUc+XNJZd7Qm2a5j1vZHgY+fazadNFWFaMK/2vye0JVlxV3gHmC0WDfAOQw==",
"license": "MIT",
"engines": {
"node": ">= 20.19.0"
},
"funding": {
"url": "https://paulmillr.com/funding/"
}
},
"node_modules/@noble/curves": {
"version": "2.0.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@noble/curves/-/curves-2.0.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-vs1Az2OOTBiP4q0pwjW5aF0xp9n4MxVrmkFBxc6EKZc6ddYx5gaZiAsZoq0uRRXWbi3AT/sBqn05eRPtn1JCPw==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@noble/hashes": "2.0.1"
},
"engines": {
"node": ">= 20.19.0"
},
"funding": {
"url": "https://paulmillr.com/funding/"
}
},
"node_modules/@noble/hashes": {
"version": "2.0.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@noble/hashes/-/hashes-2.0.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-XlOlEbQcE9fmuXxrVTXCTlG2nlRXa9Rj3rr5Ue/+tX+nmkgbX720YHh0VR3hBF9xDvwnb8D2shVGOwNx+ulArw==",
"license": "MIT",
"engines": {
"node": ">= 20.19.0"
},
"funding": {
"url": "https://paulmillr.com/funding/"
}
},
"node_modules/@react-email/render": {
"version": "1.1.2",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@react-email/render/-/render-1.1.2.tgz",
@@ -1031,6 +1071,42 @@
"react-dom": "^18.0 || ^19.0 || ^19.0.0-rc"
}
},
"node_modules/@scure/base": {
"version": "2.0.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@scure/base/-/base-2.0.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-3E1kpuZginKkek01ovG8krQ0Z44E3DHPjc5S2rjJw9lZn3KSQOs8S7wqikF/AH7iRanHypj85uGyxk0XAyC37w==",
"license": "MIT",
"funding": {
"url": "https://paulmillr.com/funding/"
}
},
"node_modules/@scure/bip32": {
"version": "2.0.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@scure/bip32/-/bip32-2.0.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-4Md1NI5BzoVP+bhyJaY3K6yMesEFzNS1sE/cP+9nuvE7p/b0kx9XbpDHHFl8dHtufcbdHRUUQdRqLIPHN/s7yA==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@noble/curves": "2.0.1",
"@noble/hashes": "2.0.1",
"@scure/base": "2.0.0"
},
"funding": {
"url": "https://paulmillr.com/funding/"
}
},
"node_modules/@scure/bip39": {
"version": "2.0.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@scure/bip39/-/bip39-2.0.1.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-PsxdFj/d2AcJcZDX1FXN3dDgitDDTmwf78rKZq1a6c1P1Nan1X/Sxc7667zU3U+AN60g7SxxP0YCVw2H/hBycg==",
"license": "MIT",
"dependencies": {
"@noble/hashes": "2.0.1",
"@scure/base": "2.0.0"
},
"funding": {
"url": "https://paulmillr.com/funding/"
}
},
"node_modules/@selderee/plugin-htmlparser2": {
"version": "0.11.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/@selderee/plugin-htmlparser2/-/plugin-htmlparser2-0.11.0.tgz",
@@ -4021,6 +4097,35 @@
"node": ">=0.10.0"
}
},
"node_modules/nostr-tools": {
"version": "2.23.9",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nostr-tools/-/nostr-tools-2.23.9.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-PBN3TpGh+EszlTZWpQdvcqEMqhcKcY1vTw0Xkkccg+TyP7y/icu9/iXJw72aFZ/ETm35ehU0hneGTXLaTSkImw==",
"license": "Unlicense",
"dependencies": {
"@noble/ciphers": "2.1.1",
"@noble/curves": "2.0.1",
"@noble/hashes": "2.0.1",
"@scure/base": "2.0.0",
"@scure/bip32": "2.0.1",
"@scure/bip39": "2.0.1",
"nostr-wasm": "0.1.0"
},
"peerDependencies": {
"typescript": ">=5.0.0"
},
"peerDependenciesMeta": {
"typescript": {
"optional": true
}
}
},
"node_modules/nostr-wasm": {
"version": "0.1.0",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/nostr-wasm/-/nostr-wasm-0.1.0.tgz",
"integrity": "sha512-78BTryCLcLYv96ONU8Ws3Q1JzjlAt+43pWQhIl86xZmWeegYCNLPml7yQ+gG3vR6V5h4XGj+TxO+SS5dsThQIA==",
"license": "MIT"
},
"node_modules/npm-run-path": {
"version": "4.0.1",
"resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/npm-run-path/-/npm-run-path-4.0.1.tgz",
+1
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
"dotenv": "^16.0.3",
"express": "^4.21.3",
"node-pg-migrate": "^8.0.4",
"nostr-tools": "^2.23.9",
"pg": "^8.15.5",
"qrcode": "^1.5.3",
"resend": "^4.0.0",
+148 -71
View File
@@ -6,11 +6,68 @@ const express = require('express');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const asyncHandler = require('../middleware/asyncHandler');
const { ValidationError, NotFoundError } = require('../utils/errors');
const { verifyNip98Event } = require('../utils/nip98');
module.exports = function createAuthRoutes(ctx) {
const { db } = ctx;
const router = express.Router();
/**
* Atomically consume a challenge nonce, single-use, bound to a socket.
* A single UPDATE ... WHERE used=FALSE ... RETURNING flips FALSE->TRUE for exactly
* one caller, so two concurrent requests can never both pass (no SELECT/UPDATE TOCTOU).
* Returns true iff this call is the one that consumed a fresh, unexpired challenge.
*/
async function consumeChallenge(challenge, socketId) {
const consumed = await db.query(`
UPDATE smirk_challenges
SET used = TRUE
WHERE challenge = $1 AND socket_id = $2 AND used = FALSE AND expires_at > NOW()
RETURNING id
`, [challenge, socketId]);
return consumed.rows.length > 0;
}
/**
* Link a proven wallet key to the user resolved from socketId, then send the
* success response shape the client expects ({ success, linked }). Shared by the
* NIP-98 and legacy Ed25519 paths.
*/
async function linkSmirkKey(provenKey, socketId, res) {
const userResult = await db.query(`
SELECT id FROM users WHERE socket_id = $1
`, [socketId]);
if (userResult.rows.length === 0) {
throw new NotFoundError('User session not found', {
safeMessage: 'No active session found. Please connect to the game first.'
});
}
const userId = userResult.rows[0].id;
// Reject linking a wallet already bound to a different account.
const existingLink = await db.query(`
SELECT id FROM users WHERE smirk_public_key = $1 AND id != $2
`, [provenKey, userId]);
if (existingLink.rows.length > 0) {
throw new ValidationError('Wallet already linked', {
safeMessage: 'This wallet is already linked to another account.'
});
}
await db.query(`
UPDATE users SET smirk_public_key = $1 WHERE id = $2
`, [provenKey, userId]);
res.json({
success: true,
linked: true,
message: 'Smirk wallet linked successfully'
});
}
/**
* POST /api/auth/smirk/challenge
* Generate a challenge for Smirk wallet signature verification
@@ -48,54 +105,96 @@ router.post('/api/auth/smirk/challenge', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
/**
* POST /api/auth/smirk/verify
* Verify a Smirk wallet signature and link to user session
* Body: { socketId: string, challenge: string, publicKey: string, signature: string }
* Verify a Smirk wallet auth proof and link the wallet to the user session.
* Two accepted request shapes:
* - NIP-98: { socketId, event } -> nostr kind:27235 HTTP-auth event (preferred)
* - Legacy: { socketId, challenge, publicKey, signature } -> Ed25519 challenge signing
*/
router.post('/api/auth/smirk/verify', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const { socketId, challenge, publicKey, signature } = req.body || {};
const body = req.body || {};
const { socketId } = body;
if (!socketId || !challenge || !publicKey || !signature) {
if (!socketId || typeof socketId !== 'string') {
throw new ValidationError('Missing socketId', {
safeMessage: 'socketId is required.'
});
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// NIP-98 path — a nostr event object is present.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
if (body.event && typeof body.event === 'object' && !Array.isArray(body.event)) {
// Extract the challenge carried by the event's 'challenge' tag WITHOUT trusting
// the rest of the event yet. We consume the server nonce single-use FIRST, then
// cryptographically verify the event is bound to that exact nonce.
const rawTags = Array.isArray(body.event.tags) ? body.event.tags : [];
const challengeTags = rawTags.filter((t) => Array.isArray(t) && t[0] === 'challenge');
const challenge = challengeTags.length === 1 ? challengeTags[0][1] : null;
if (!challenge || typeof challenge !== 'string') {
throw new ValidationError('Invalid NIP-98 event', {
safeMessage: 'The authentication event is missing its challenge.'
});
}
// Atomic single-use consume (bound to this socket) — prevents replay/double-use.
const consumed = await consumeChallenge(challenge, socketId);
if (!consumed) {
throw new ValidationError('Invalid or expired challenge', {
safeMessage: 'The challenge is invalid, expired, or has already been used.'
});
}
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const result = verifyNip98Event(body.event, {
challenge,
expectedPathSuffix: '/api/auth/smirk/verify',
now,
maxSkewSec: 120
});
if (!result.ok) {
throw new ValidationError('Invalid NIP-98 event', {
safeMessage: 'The authentication event could not be verified.'
});
}
// NOTE: result.pubkey is a nostr x-only secp256k1 key (64-hex) — a DIFFERENT
// key namespace than the legacy Ed25519 spend key. A NIP-98 login therefore
// re-registers the account under the nostr key (acceptable per the cutover spec).
await linkSmirkKey(result.pubkey, socketId, res);
return;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Legacy Ed25519 path — { challenge, publicKey, signature }.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const { challenge, publicKey, signature } = body;
if (!challenge || !publicKey || !signature) {
throw new ValidationError('Missing required fields', {
safeMessage: 'socketId, challenge, publicKey, and signature are required.'
});
}
// 1. Verify challenge exists, is not used, and has not expired
const challengeResult = await db.query(`
SELECT * FROM smirk_challenges
WHERE challenge = $1 AND socket_id = $2 AND used = FALSE AND expires_at > NOW()
`, [challenge, socketId]);
if (challengeResult.rows.length === 0) {
// Consume the challenge single-use (atomic) before verifying the signature.
const consumed = await consumeChallenge(challenge, socketId);
if (!consumed) {
throw new ValidationError('Invalid or expired challenge', {
safeMessage: 'The challenge is invalid, expired, or has already been used.'
});
}
// 2. Mark challenge as used immediately (prevent replay attacks)
await db.query(`
UPDATE smirk_challenges SET used = TRUE WHERE id = $1
`, [challengeResult.rows[0].id]);
// 3. Verify signature using tweetnacl
// Accepts both formats during transition:
// - RFC 8032 standard: signature over raw UTF-8 message bytes (new extension)
// - Legacy: signature over SHA256(message) (old extension, remove after 2026-07-01)
// Verify Ed25519 signature over the RAW UTF-8 challenge bytes (RFC 8032).
// The deprecated SHA256(challenge) pre-hash fallback was removed (past its
// 2026-07-01 removal date) — only the raw-bytes verify remains.
let isValidSignature = false;
try {
const nacl = require('tweetnacl');
const signatureBytes = Buffer.from(signature, 'hex');
const publicKeyBytes = Buffer.from(publicKey, 'hex');
// Try RFC 8032 standard first (raw message bytes)
const challengeBytes = Buffer.from(challenge, 'utf8');
isValidSignature = nacl.sign.detached.verify(challengeBytes, signatureBytes, publicKeyBytes);
// Fall back to legacy SHA256 pre-hash (DEPRECATED — remove after 2026-07-01)
if (!isValidSignature) {
const challengeHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(challenge).digest();
isValidSignature = nacl.sign.detached.verify(challengeHash, signatureBytes, publicKeyBytes);
}
} catch (verifyError) {
console.error('Signature verification error:', verifyError.message);
throw new ValidationError('Signature verification failed', {
@@ -109,46 +208,20 @@ router.post('/api/auth/smirk/verify', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
});
}
// 4. Link public key to user session
const userResult = await db.query(`
SELECT id FROM users WHERE socket_id = $1
`, [socketId]);
if (userResult.rows.length === 0) {
throw new NotFoundError('User session not found', {
safeMessage: 'No active session found. Please connect to the game first.'
});
}
const userId = userResult.rows[0].id;
// Check if this public key is already linked to another user
const existingLink = await db.query(`
SELECT id FROM users WHERE smirk_public_key = $1 AND id != $2
`, [publicKey, userId]);
if (existingLink.rows.length > 0) {
throw new ValidationError('Wallet already linked', {
safeMessage: 'This wallet is already linked to another account.'
});
}
// Link the wallet to this user
await db.query(`
UPDATE users SET smirk_public_key = $1 WHERE id = $2
`, [publicKey, userId]);
res.json({
success: true,
linked: true,
message: 'Smirk wallet linked successfully'
});
await linkSmirkKey(publicKey, socketId, res);
}));
/**
* GET /api/auth/smirk/status
* Check if a session has a linked Smirk wallet
* Query: socketId=string
* Check if a session has a linked Smirk wallet.
* Query: socketId=string ; Auth: X-Session-Token header (fallback ?t=).
*
* BOLA fix: previously this disclosed { linked, hasPayoutAddress } for ANY socketId
* with no auth, letting anyone probe another player's wallet-link state. We now
* require the caller to prove ownership of the socketId via the session token
* (users.anon_token) — the same guard used by /api/user/:socketId/* in index.js
* (requireSessionOwnership). We only resolve the row whose socket_id AND anon_token
* both match; a mismatch/absent token gets 401/403 and learns nothing.
*/
router.get('/api/auth/smirk/status', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
const { socketId } = req.query;
@@ -159,16 +232,20 @@ router.get('/api/auth/smirk/status', asyncHandler(async (req, res) => {
});
}
const token = req.get('X-Session-Token') || req.query.t;
if (!token) {
return res.status(401).json({ error: 'Session token required' });
}
const result = await db.query(`
SELECT smirk_public_key, payout_address FROM users WHERE socket_id = $1
`, [socketId]);
SELECT smirk_public_key, payout_address
FROM users
WHERE socket_id = $1 AND anon_token = $2
`, [socketId, token]);
if (result.rows.length === 0) {
res.json({
linked: false,
hasPayoutAddress: false
});
return;
// Do not disclose whether the socketId exists — ownership check failed.
return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Session ownership verification failed' });
}
const user = result.rows[0];
+164
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
/**
* Secure NIP-98 (HTTP Auth, kind:27235) event verification.
*
* Pure + side-effect free (no DB, no I/O) so it can be unit-tested with a plain
* round-trip using nostr-tools. The route layer is responsible for issuing and
* single-use-consuming the server challenge nonce; this module only proves that a
* signed event is well-formed, authentic, fresh, and bound to the expected
* method/URL/challenge.
*
* SECURITY — why we do NOT rely on nostr-tools verifyEvent() alone:
* nostr-tools memoizes its result on the event object via an internal
* Symbol(verified). A caller that reuses/mutates an already-"verified" object in
* the same process could otherwise bypass a re-check. We defend two ways:
* 1. We rebuild a CLEAN event object from only the canonical primitive fields,
* so it can never carry a stamped verified-symbol (freshly-parsed wire JSON
* can't carry a JS Symbol either, but this makes the guarantee explicit).
* 2. We INDEPENDENTLY recompute the event id (getEventHash) and compare it to
* the claimed id. This catches any content/tag tampering with zero reliance
* on verifyEvent's memoization, before we ever check the schnorr signature.
*/
/**
* Load nostr-tools in a way that works in BOTH runtimes:
* - Production (plain Node >=22): a normal require() succeeds — Node natively
* require()s nostr-tools' ESM-only transitive deps (@noble/*).
* - A CJS-only test runtime (Jest without --experimental-vm-modules) cannot parse
* those ESM deps, so we fall back to nostr-tools' pre-bundled build, which is a
* single self-contained esbuild IIFE with every dependency inlined (no import /
* no external require) and is therefore safe to evaluate in-process.
* Same public API either way (getEventHash, verifyEvent, ...).
*/
function loadNostrTools() {
try {
return require('nostr-tools');
} catch (_e) {
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const cjsIndex = require.resolve('nostr-tools'); // .../nostr-tools/lib/cjs/index.js
const bundlePath = path.join(path.dirname(cjsIndex), '..', 'nostr.bundle.js');
const src = fs.readFileSync(bundlePath, 'utf8');
// eslint-disable-next-line no-new-func
return new Function(`${src}\nreturn NostrTools;`)();
}
}
const { getEventHash, verifyEvent } = loadNostrTools();
const HEX_64 = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/; // x-only secp256k1 pubkey / event id
const HEX_128 = /^[0-9a-f]{128}$/; // BIP-340 schnorr signature
const NIP98_KIND = 27235;
function fail(reason) {
return { ok: false, reason };
}
/**
* @param {object} event A NIP-98 kind:27235 event: { kind, created_at, pubkey, id, sig, content, tags }.
* @param {object} opts
* @param {string} opts.challenge Server nonce that the event's 'challenge' tag must equal.
* @param {string} [opts.expectedPathSuffix] The 'u' tag URL path must end with this. Default '/api/auth/smirk/verify'.
* @param {string} [opts.expectedHost] If set, the 'u' tag URL host must equal this.
* @param {number} [opts.now] Current unix seconds (for freshness). Default Date.now()/1000.
* @param {number} [opts.maxSkewSec] Max allowed |now - created_at|. Default 120.
* @returns {{ ok: boolean, pubkey?: string, reason?: string }}
*/
function verifyNip98Event(event, opts = {}) {
const {
challenge,
expectedPathSuffix = '/api/auth/smirk/verify',
expectedHost = null,
now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
maxSkewSec = 120,
} = opts;
if (!challenge || typeof challenge !== 'string') {
return fail('missing-expected-challenge');
}
// (a) Shape/type validation. Nostr events carry kind & created_at as NUMBERS and
// pubkey/id/sig/content as strings; tags is an array of string arrays.
if (!event || typeof event !== 'object' || Array.isArray(event)) {
return fail('event-not-object');
}
if (typeof event.kind !== 'number') return fail('kind-not-number');
if (typeof event.created_at !== 'number' || !Number.isFinite(event.created_at)) {
return fail('created_at-not-number');
}
if (typeof event.pubkey !== 'string' || !HEX_64.test(event.pubkey)) return fail('bad-pubkey');
if (typeof event.id !== 'string' || !HEX_64.test(event.id)) return fail('bad-id');
if (typeof event.sig !== 'string' || !HEX_128.test(event.sig)) return fail('bad-sig');
if (typeof event.content !== 'string') return fail('content-not-string');
if (!Array.isArray(event.tags)) return fail('tags-not-array');
for (const tag of event.tags) {
if (!Array.isArray(tag) || tag.some((v) => typeof v !== 'string')) {
return fail('malformed-tag');
}
}
// (b) Must be a NIP-98 HTTP Auth event.
if (event.kind !== NIP98_KIND) return fail('wrong-kind');
// Rebuild a clean event from primitives only — strips any inherited verified-symbol
// and any extra properties, so verifyEvent() below is forced to actually verify.
const clean = {
kind: event.kind,
created_at: event.created_at,
pubkey: event.pubkey,
id: event.id,
sig: event.sig,
content: event.content,
tags: event.tags.map((t) => t.slice()),
};
// (c) Independently recompute the id. Defeats content/tag tampering regardless of
// any memoization inside verifyEvent.
let recomputedId;
try {
recomputedId = getEventHash(clean);
} catch (_e) {
return fail('hash-error');
}
if (recomputedId !== clean.id) return fail('id-mismatch');
// (d) BIP-340 schnorr signature over secp256k1 (x-only 64-hex pubkey, 128-hex sig).
let sigOk = false;
try {
sigOk = verifyEvent(clean) === true;
} catch (_e) {
return fail('sig-verify-threw');
}
if (!sigOk) return fail('bad-signature');
// (e) Freshness — reject clock skew / replayed-late events.
if (Math.abs(now - Number(clean.created_at)) > maxSkewSec) {
return fail('expired');
}
// (f) Tag policy: exactly-one method(POST), exactly-one matching u, exactly-one challenge.
const methodTags = clean.tags.filter((t) => t[0] === 'method');
if (methodTags.length !== 1) return fail('method-tag-count');
if (methodTags[0][1] !== 'POST') return fail('wrong-method');
const uTags = clean.tags.filter((t) => t[0] === 'u');
if (uTags.length !== 1) return fail('u-tag-count');
let url;
try {
url = new URL(uTags[0][1]);
} catch (_e) {
return fail('bad-u-url');
}
if (!url.pathname.endsWith(expectedPathSuffix)) return fail('wrong-u-path');
if (expectedHost && url.host !== expectedHost && url.hostname !== expectedHost) {
return fail('wrong-u-host');
}
const challengeTags = clean.tags.filter((t) => t[0] === 'challenge');
if (challengeTags.length !== 1) return fail('challenge-tag-count');
if (challengeTags[0][1] !== challenge) return fail('challenge-mismatch');
// (g) Success — return the proven x-only pubkey, lowercased.
return { ok: true, pubkey: clean.pubkey.toLowerCase() };
}
module.exports = { verifyNip98Event };
+310
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
/**
* Adversarial round-trip tests for the secure NIP-98 verifier (src/utils/nip98.js).
*
* We sign REAL kind:27235 events with nostr-tools (generateSecretKey / getPublicKey /
* finalizeEvent) and then attack them: tamper content/tags, wrong kind/method/url,
* stale timestamps, flipped signatures, and the memoization-bypass trick. The verifier
* is exercised directly (no HTTP). Case (ix) — single-use / replay — is enforced at the
* route layer, so we drive the real Express route with a mock DB for that one.
*/
// nostr-tools is installed under src/node_modules (the app package lives in src/).
// Load it resiliently: a normal require works under plain Node (>=22 require()s the
// ESM-only @noble deps), but Jest's CJS runtime can't parse those, so we fall back to
// nostr-tools' self-contained pre-bundled build (an esbuild IIFE with deps inlined).
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
function loadNostrTools() {
const cjsIndex = require.resolve('nostr-tools', { paths: [path.join(__dirname, '..', 'src')] });
try {
return require(cjsIndex);
} catch (_e) {
const bundlePath = path.join(path.dirname(cjsIndex), '..', 'nostr.bundle.js');
// eslint-disable-next-line no-new-func
return new Function(`${fs.readFileSync(bundlePath, 'utf8')}\nreturn NostrTools;`)();
}
}
const {
generateSecretKey,
getPublicKey,
finalizeEvent,
getEventHash,
verifyEvent,
} = loadNostrTools();
const { verifyNip98Event } = require('../src/utils/nip98');
const PATH_SUFFIX = '/api/auth/smirk/verify';
const HOST = 'game.example';
const U = `https://${HOST}${PATH_SUFFIX}`;
const NOW = 1_800_000_000; // fixed reference so freshness is deterministic
const CHALLENGE = 'server-nonce-abc123';
// Sign a fresh event; opts override any field. `tags` (if given) fully replaces the default trio.
function buildEvent(sk, opts = {}) {
const {
kind = 27235,
created_at = NOW,
content = '',
challenge = CHALLENGE,
u = U,
method = 'POST',
tags,
} = opts;
const template = {
kind,
created_at,
content,
tags: tags || [['u', u], ['method', method], ['challenge', challenge]],
};
return finalizeEvent(template, sk);
}
// The opts every "happy-path expected" call shares.
function baseOpts(extra = {}) {
return {
challenge: CHALLENGE,
expectedPathSuffix: PATH_SUFFIX,
now: NOW,
maxSkewSec: 120,
...extra,
};
}
describe('verifyNip98Event — adversarial round-trip', () => {
test('(i) a valid, correctly-signed event is accepted and returns the x-only pubkey', () => {
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const ev = buildEvent(sk);
const r = verifyNip98Event(ev, baseOpts());
expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
expect(r.pubkey).toBe(getPublicKey(sk)); // nostr-tools returns lowercase 64-hex
expect(r.pubkey).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
// host binding also passes when the expected host matches
expect(verifyNip98Event(ev, baseOpts({ expectedHost: HOST })).ok).toBe(true);
});
test('(ii) tampering with content after signing is rejected (independent id recompute)', () => {
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const ev = buildEvent(sk);
ev.content = 'malicious-payload'; // id no longer matches the (unchanged) claimed id
const r = verifyNip98Event(ev, baseOpts());
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.reason).toBe('id-mismatch');
});
test('(iii) tampering with a tag value after signing is rejected', () => {
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const ev = buildEvent(sk, { challenge: CHALLENGE });
// Rewrite the challenge tag to a different value post-signature.
ev.tags = ev.tags.map((t) => (t[0] === 'challenge' ? ['challenge', 'swapped-value'] : t));
const r = verifyNip98Event(ev, baseOpts({ challenge: 'swapped-value' }));
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.reason).toBe('id-mismatch');
});
test('(iii-b) a validly-signed event bound to a DIFFERENT challenge than the server nonce is rejected', () => {
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const ev = buildEvent(sk, { challenge: 'nonce-the-client-signed' });
const r = verifyNip98Event(ev, baseOpts({ challenge: 'the-server-actually-issued-this' }));
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.reason).toBe('challenge-mismatch');
});
test('(iv) wrong kind is rejected even when the signature is valid', () => {
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const ev = buildEvent(sk, { kind: 1 });
const r = verifyNip98Event(ev, baseOpts());
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.reason).toBe('wrong-kind');
});
test('(v) an expired created_at (beyond maxSkew) is rejected — past and future', () => {
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const stale = buildEvent(sk, { created_at: NOW - 10_000 });
const past = verifyNip98Event(stale, baseOpts({ now: NOW }));
expect(past.ok).toBe(false);
expect(past.reason).toBe('expired');
const future = buildEvent(sk, { created_at: NOW + 10_000 });
expect(verifyNip98Event(future, baseOpts({ now: NOW })).reason).toBe('expired');
// A timestamp exactly at the skew boundary is still accepted.
const edge = buildEvent(sk, { created_at: NOW - 120 });
expect(verifyNip98Event(edge, baseOpts({ now: NOW })).ok).toBe(true);
});
test('(vi) a wrong "u" path is rejected; a wrong host is rejected when expectedHost is set', () => {
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const wrongPath = buildEvent(sk, { u: `https://${HOST}/api/wrong/endpoint` });
const rPath = verifyNip98Event(wrongPath, baseOpts());
expect(rPath.ok).toBe(false);
expect(rPath.reason).toBe('wrong-u-path');
const wrongHost = buildEvent(sk, { u: `https://evil.example${PATH_SUFFIX}` });
const rHost = verifyNip98Event(wrongHost, baseOpts({ expectedHost: HOST }));
expect(rHost.ok).toBe(false);
expect(rHost.reason).toBe('wrong-u-host');
});
test('(vii) a wrong method tag is rejected', () => {
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const ev = buildEvent(sk, { method: 'GET' });
const r = verifyNip98Event(ev, baseOpts());
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.reason).toBe('wrong-method');
});
test('(viii) a flipped signature byte is rejected', () => {
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const ev = buildEvent(sk);
const first = ev.sig[0] === 'f' ? 'e' : 'f';
ev.sig = first + ev.sig.slice(1); // stays 128-hex, but no longer a valid schnorr sig
const r = verifyNip98Event(ev, baseOpts());
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.reason).toBe('bad-signature');
});
test('exactly-one tag policy: duplicate or missing challenge/method tags are rejected', () => {
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const dupChallenge = buildEvent(sk, {
tags: [['u', U], ['method', 'POST'], ['challenge', CHALLENGE], ['challenge', CHALLENGE]],
});
expect(verifyNip98Event(dupChallenge, baseOpts()).reason).toBe('challenge-tag-count');
const noChallenge = buildEvent(sk, { tags: [['u', U], ['method', 'POST']] });
expect(verifyNip98Event(noChallenge, baseOpts()).reason).toBe('challenge-tag-count');
const dupMethod = buildEvent(sk, {
tags: [['u', U], ['method', 'POST'], ['method', 'POST'], ['challenge', CHALLENGE]],
});
expect(verifyNip98Event(dupMethod, baseOpts()).reason).toBe('method-tag-count');
});
test('shape validation: non-27235 primitives / bad hex / non-object are rejected safely', () => {
expect(verifyNip98Event(null, baseOpts()).ok).toBe(false);
expect(verifyNip98Event('nope', baseOpts()).ok).toBe(false);
expect(verifyNip98Event({}, baseOpts()).ok).toBe(false);
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const ev = buildEvent(sk);
// Corrupt the pubkey to non-hex — must not throw, must reject.
const bad = { ...ev, pubkey: 'zz' + ev.pubkey.slice(2) };
const r = verifyNip98Event(bad, baseOpts());
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
});
test('CRITICAL: the nostr-tools verified-memo cannot bypass our re-verification', () => {
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const ev = buildEvent(sk);
// Prime nostr-tools' internal memo by verifying the pristine event once.
expect(verifyEvent(ev)).toBe(true);
// Attacker mutates content AND repairs the id so a naive hash check would pass,
// then leans on the STALE memo to skip re-verification.
ev.content = 'tampered-after-memoization';
ev.id = getEventHash({
kind: ev.kind,
created_at: ev.created_at,
pubkey: ev.pubkey,
tags: ev.tags,
content: ev.content,
});
// Demonstrate the vulnerability we defend against: nostr-tools returns the stale
// memoized `true` for the now-tampered object.
expect(verifyEvent(ev)).toBe(true);
// Our verifier rebuilds a clean event (no memo symbol) and re-runs schnorr, so the
// signature — made over the ORIGINAL content — fails against the repaired id.
const r = verifyNip98Event(ev, baseOpts());
expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
expect(r.reason).toBe('bad-signature');
});
});
describe('(ix) route layer — single-use challenge consume rejects replay', () => {
const express = require('express');
const http = require('http');
const createAuthRoutes = require('../src/routes/auth');
// Mock DB modelling the atomic single-use UPDATE ... WHERE used=FALSE ... RETURNING.
function mockDb(challengeValue, socketId) {
const challenges = new Map([[challengeValue, { id: 1, socket_id: socketId, used: false }]]);
return {
challenges,
query: async (sql, params = []) => {
const s = sql.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
if (/^UPDATE smirk_challenges SET used = TRUE/i.test(s)) {
const [ch, sock] = params;
const row = challenges.get(ch);
if (row && row.socket_id === sock && row.used === false) {
row.used = true; // atomic FALSE -> TRUE, exactly once
return { rows: [{ id: row.id }] };
}
return { rows: [] };
}
if (/SELECT id FROM users WHERE socket_id = \$1$/i.test(s)) {
return { rows: [{ id: 77 }] };
}
if (/SELECT id FROM users WHERE smirk_public_key = \$1 AND id != \$2/i.test(s)) {
return { rows: [] }; // not linked elsewhere
}
if (/^UPDATE users SET smirk_public_key = \$1/i.test(s)) {
return { rows: [] };
}
return { rows: [] };
},
};
}
function startServer(db) {
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use(createAuthRoutes({ db }));
// Minimal error handler mirroring the app's (ValidationError -> 400, etc.).
app.use((err, req, res, _next) => {
res.status(err.statusCode || 500).json({ error: err.message });
});
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const server = http.createServer(app);
server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve(server));
});
}
async function postJson(server, path, body) {
const { port } = server.address();
const res = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}${path}`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify(body),
});
const json = await res.json().catch(() => ({}));
return { status: res.status, json };
}
test('a valid NIP-98 event links once, then the identical replay is rejected', async () => {
const sk = generateSecretKey();
const socketId = 'sock-xyz-1';
const challenge = 'route-nonce-9f8e7d';
// created_at must be genuinely fresh — the route uses real Date.now().
const ev = buildEvent(sk, { created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000), challenge });
const db = mockDb(challenge, socketId);
const server = await startServer(db);
try {
const first = await postJson(server, PATH_SUFFIX, { socketId, event: ev });
expect(first.status).toBe(200);
expect(first.json).toMatchObject({ success: true, linked: true });
expect(db.challenges.get(challenge).used).toBe(true);
// Replay the exact same event: the single-use consume now fails -> 400.
const second = await postJson(server, PATH_SUFFIX, { socketId, event: ev });
expect(second.status).toBe(400);
expect(second.json.error).toBeTruthy();
} finally {
server.close();
}
});
});