security: escape XSS sinks client-side and add CSP + security headers

The client trusted the server to pre-escape chat content and rendered
user-supplied fields via .html()/innerHTML — one server regression away from
stored XSS, and the admin panel injected user-controlled payout addresses
into its authenticated DOM.

- Add a single shared escapeHtml helper (escapes all five HTML-significant
  chars including both quotes); leaderboard now delegates to it.
- Escape chat username + message in onChatBroadcast/onChatHistory.
- Escape user-controlled fields in the admin panel (payout address, socket
  id, player name, status) and make its local escapeHtml quote-safe so values
  in title="..." can't break out.
- Add CSP plus X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options and Referrer-Policy
  headers via middleware. connect-src 'self' keeps Socket.IO working;
  removing 'unsafe-inline' (nonces) is tracked as a later cleanup.

Full suite: 13 suites / 119 tests.
This commit is contained in:
jwinterm
2026-05-31 09:40:34 -04:00
parent 5c546a1473
commit a664a8bbce
7 changed files with 71 additions and 17 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Key: `S` ≤ half day · `M` ~1–3 days · `L` ~1 week+ · 🔴 launch-blocker
- [x] **0.3 🔴 M — Fix batch-payout `tx_hash` collision + double-pay.** ✅ Migration 015 drops the payouts `tx_hash` unique index (batches legitimately share a tx_hash) and extends the one-per-game guard to cover `processing`. Batch completion now happens in ONE transaction via `id = ANY` (no row stranded mid-batch); BIGINT stat math (no float). Ambiguous batch failures → `needs_review` (retry service won't re-send) + operator alert. New `batchPayout.test.js` covers both paths.
- [x] **0.4 🔴 S — Harden identity transport.** ✅ Client sends `anon_token` in handshake `auth` (not the URL query → no proxy/referer/access-log leakage); server reads `auth` first with a query-string fallback for older clients. Token is now **rotated on every resume** (`rotateToken`), so a leaked token is invalidated when the real owner reconnects; client already persists the returned token. Rotation + old-token-replay-rejection test added to `security.test.js`.
- [x] **0.5 🟠 S — Single-game disconnect recovery.** ✅ `recoverPendingPayments` now also recovers confirmed-but-unconsumed `single_game` payments (no `games.payment_id` link) by granting the equivalent credits, idempotently (per-payment reason key, row-locked). Disconnect preservation made deterministic: the stable `dbUserId` is **stamped on the game at creation**, so suspend/restore never needs a fragile disconnect-time DB lookup — every game (paid or free) is reconnectable whenever a session exists; the drop-branch is now only the genuine no-session edge. New `singleGameRecovery.test.js` (grant / consumed / idempotent).
- [ ] **0.6 🟠 S — Client + admin XSS and CSP.** Escape chat/admin fields (`html/js/network/socketHandlers.js:291,323`; `html/admin.html`); add CSP headers.
- [x] **0.6 🟠 S — Client + admin XSS and CSP.** ✅ Single shared `escapeHtml` helper (`html/js/core/escapeHtml.js`, escapes all five chars incl. both quotes); leaderboard delegates to it. Chat sinks (`onChatBroadcast`/`onChatHistory`) now escape username + message. Admin panel escapes user-controlled fields (payout address, socket id, player name, status) and its local `escapeHtml` now escapes quotes (safe in `title="…"`). CSP + `X-Content-Type-Options`/`X-Frame-Options`/`Referrer-Policy` headers added via middleware in `index.js` (`connect-src 'self'` keeps Socket.IO working; nonce-based tightening tracked as Phase 4.4).
## Phase 1 — Money correctness hardening (🟠)
- [ ] **1.1 M — `src/money/atomic.js` BigInt module** as the only money type; remove `Number()` casts in `gameModeManager.js` and float `reduce` in `walletRPCService.js:314`.
+16 -10
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@@ -738,9 +738,9 @@
<tr>
<td>${p.id}</td>
<td>${(p.amount / atomicDivisor).toFixed(6)}</td>
<td title="${p.address || ''}">${p.address ? p.address.substring(0, 12) + '...' : '-'}</td>
<td><span class="status-badge status-${p.status}">${p.status}</span></td>
<td class="tx-hash">${p.txHash ? p.txHash.substring(0, 16) + '...' : '-'}</td>
<td title="${escapeHtml(p.address || '')}">${p.address ? escapeHtml(p.address.substring(0, 12)) + '...' : '-'}</td>
<td><span class="status-badge status-${escapeHtml(p.status)}">${escapeHtml(p.status)}</span></td>
<td class="tx-hash">${p.txHash ? escapeHtml(p.txHash.substring(0, 16)) + '...' : '-'}</td>
<td>${new Date(p.createdAt).toLocaleString()}</td>
<td>
${p.status === 'failed' || p.status === 'permanently_failed' ?
@@ -821,8 +821,8 @@
tbody.innerHTML = data.users.map(u => `
<tr>
<td>${u.id}</td>
<td title="${u.socketId}">${u.socketId ? u.socketId.substring(0, 15) + '...' : '-'}</td>
<td>${u.payoutAddress || '-'}</td>
<td title="${escapeHtml(u.socketId)}">${u.socketId ? escapeHtml(u.socketId.substring(0, 15)) + '...' : '-'}</td>
<td>${u.payoutAddress ? escapeHtml(u.payoutAddress) : '-'}</td>
<td>${u.credits || 0}</td>
<td>${u.gamesPlayed || 0}</td>
<td>${u.gamesWon || 0}</td>
@@ -879,9 +879,9 @@
<tr style="${rowStyle}">
<td>${m.id}</td>
<td>${formatTimeAgo(new Date(m.timestamp))}</td>
<td>${m.playerId || m.username || '-'}</td>
<td>${escapeHtml(m.playerId || m.username || '-')}</td>
<td style="max-width: 300px; overflow: hidden; text-overflow: ellipsis;" title="${escapeHtml(m.message)}">${escapeHtml(m.message)}</td>
<td>${m.userId || '-'}</td>
<td>${escapeHtml(m.userId || '-')}</td>
<td>
${isDeleted ? '<span class="status-badge status-failed">Deleted</span>' : ''}
${isBanned ? '<span class="status-badge status-failed">Banned</span>' : ''}
@@ -978,9 +978,15 @@
}
function escapeHtml(text) {
const div = document.createElement('div');
div.textContent = text;
return div.innerHTML;
// Escape all five HTML-significant chars (including quotes) so the result is
// safe in both element text and quoted attribute values (e.g. title="...").
if (text === null || text === undefined) return '';
return String(text)
.replace(/&/g, '&amp;')
.replace(/</g, '&lt;')
.replace(/>/g, '&gt;')
.replace(/"/g, '&quot;')
.replace(/'/g, '&#39;');
}
function formatTimeAgo(date) {
+1
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@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
<!-- Core libraries -->
<script src="js/lib/jquery-3.4.1.min.js"></script>
<script src="js/lib/rot.min.js"></script>
<script src="js/core/escapeHtml.js"></script>
<script src="js/core/options.js"></script>
<script src="js/ui/teletype.js"></script>
+18
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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
/**
* Shared HTML-escaping helper — the single source of truth for escaping untrusted
* (server- or user-supplied) text before it is inserted into innerHTML / jQuery .html().
* Escapes all five HTML-significant characters, including both quote types so the
* result is safe in both element text and quoted attribute values.
*/
(function (global) {
function escapeHtml(value) {
if (value === null || value === undefined) return '';
return String(value)
.replace(/&/g, '&amp;')
.replace(/</g, '&lt;')
.replace(/>/g, '&gt;')
.replace(/"/g, '&quot;')
.replace(/'/g, '&#39;');
}
global.escapeHtml = escapeHtml;
})(typeof window !== 'undefined' ? window : this);
+4 -2
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@@ -288,7 +288,9 @@ const SocketHandlers = {
onChatBroadcast: function(data) {
const msgElement = $('<li style="color: #aaa;">');
if (data.socketId) {
msgElement.html('<strong>' + data.socketId.substring(0, 6) + ':</strong> ' + data.message);
// Escape both fields — chat content is attacker-controlled. Defense in depth:
// the server also escapes, but the client must never trust that.
msgElement.html('<strong>' + escapeHtml(String(data.socketId).substring(0, 6)) + ':</strong> ' + escapeHtml(data.message));
} else {
msgElement.text(data.message);
}
@@ -320,7 +322,7 @@ const SocketHandlers = {
if (msg.timestamp) {
timeStr = '<span style="color:#555;font-size:10px;">[' + SocketHandlers._formatTimeAgo(new Date(msg.timestamp)) + ']</span> ';
}
msgElement.html(timeStr + '<strong>' + username + ':</strong> ' + msg.message);
msgElement.html(timeStr + '<strong>' + escapeHtml(username) + ':</strong> ' + escapeHtml(msg.message));
$('#messages').append(msgElement);
});
+7 -4
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@@ -127,12 +127,15 @@ const Leaderboard = {
},
_escapeHtml: function(str) {
// Delegate to the shared helper (single source of truth). Falls back to a local
// implementation if the helper somehow isn't loaded.
if (typeof window !== 'undefined' && typeof window.escapeHtml === 'function') {
return window.escapeHtml(str);
}
if (!str) return '';
return String(str)
.replace(/&/g, '&amp;')
.replace(/</g, '&lt;')
.replace(/>/g, '&gt;')
.replace(/"/g, '&quot;');
.replace(/&/g, '&amp;').replace(/</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;')
.replace(/"/g, '&quot;').replace(/'/g, '&#39;');
}
};
+24
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@@ -54,6 +54,30 @@ let payoutRetryService = null; // Initialized later when payment system starts
let batchPayoutInterval = null; // Initialized later when payment system starts
let paymentExpiryInterval = null; // Initialized later when payment system starts
const socketHandlers = new SocketHandlers(io, activeGames, broadcastManager, debugManager, gameModeManager, walletRPCService);
// Security headers (defense in depth alongside output escaping).
// CSP locks down where scripts/styles/connections may come from. Inline scripts/styles
// are still permitted ('unsafe-inline') because the current pages rely on them heavily;
// removing that is tracked as Phase 4.4 (nonce-based CSP). connect-src 'self' covers
// same-origin Socket.IO websockets under CSP Level 3.
app.use((req, res, next) => {
res.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', [
"default-src 'self'",
"script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.socket.io https://cdn.jsdelivr.net",
"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
"img-src 'self' data:",
"font-src 'self'",
"connect-src 'self' https://smirk.cash",
"object-src 'none'",
"base-uri 'self'",
"frame-ancestors 'self'",
"form-action 'self'"
].join('; '));
res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
res.setHeader('X-Frame-Options', 'SAMEORIGIN');
res.setHeader('Referrer-Policy', 'no-referrer');
next();
});
// Configure static file serving
const htmlPath = path.join(__dirname, '../html');
app.use(express.static(htmlPath, {