jwinterm
b03b9cb90d
The last operator subsystem: a user who no longer trusts the backend can reach in and delete their data. Action-bound and two-phase. - migration 20260626000003: erasure_requests (user_id ON DELETE SET NULL so the completed tombstone survives the user delete; one-live-request-per-user partial unique index; due index). - Proof model (§5.2): every action is a fresh NIP-98 signed action (purpose erasure_request/confirm/cancel/export) bound to a single-use challenge nonce + canonical descriptor + (confirm/cancel) the explicit erasure_id. A session token is NEVER sufficient. Erasure targets only the users.id the proof's key resolves to (via linked nostr_pubkey); leaked identifiers are never selectors. Nonce consumed AFTER signature checks (forged sig can't burn a victim's nonce). - Public routes (proof-gated): POST /account/erasure/challenge, /account/erasure (request; ABSENT-user path returns identical shape — no account-existence oracle), /account/erasure/:id/confirm (revokes live sessions), DELETE /account/erasure/:id (cancel during grace), POST /account/export (see-before- delete; omits view keys; audited). - Execution (§5.7): a background sweeper claims confirmed-past-grace rows (FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED) and runs ONE fail-closed tx: purge login_events (the origin/asset/time quasi-identifier; default) or anonymize; scrub audit PII; DELETE users (schema cascades wallets/sessions/keys/owned slatepacks, SET NULL on counterparty/audit/login links); tombstone; hash-chained account_erasure_completed audit. - config: ERASURE_GRACE_PERIOD_HOURS (72h default); validate() requires the integrity secret + PUBLIC_API_URL when erasure is enabled. - 1 L1 test: export -> request -> confirm -> execute -> account gone, plus the absent-user constant-shape path. Scope (v1, documented): live primary. No at-rest view key exists to crypto-shred (stateless-forward), so backup residue is bounded by retention-window docs, not crypto-shred (non-v1 per decisions ledger). Deferred: LWS de-registration queue + read-back probe (operators run their own LWS), audit cross-reference scrub on OTHER users' rows, restore_attempt salted-rotated fingerprint, retention sweepers, NIP-17 DM warning, in-flight-value blockers (no swaps/tips in the clean core), hard per-day export rate cap, /admin/erasure/stuck observability. Routes are off the public OpenAPI for now (stable contract; annotate later).
smirk-backend-core
Open, self-hostable backend for the Smirk non-custodial, multi-chain wallet. It provides the chain-access and identity surface a Smirk wallet needs — authentication, per-chain wallet access (Bitcoin, Litecoin, Monero, Wownero, Grin), the Grin slatepack relay, and Nostr-based identity — so anyone can run their own backend and a Smirk wallet can connect to it.
Status: early, under active development. Interfaces and the database schema may change before the first tagged release. Not yet recommended for production self-hosting.
What it is
- Non-custodial. The server never holds spend keys or seeds. It brokers access to blockchain data and relays wallet-to-wallet messages.
- Open core, feature-flagged. Every feature ships in this codebase and is
toggled per deployment; the wallet reads
GET /api/v1/capabilitiesand adapts to what a given backend offers. - Identity via "Sign in with Smirk". Authentication uses a seed-derived Nostr key (NIP-98); the server stores only public keys.
- Privacy first. No PII is required to use it; operator and user privacy are explicit design goals.
Architecture
Rust + Axum, PostgreSQL via sqlx. The public HTTP contract is generated from the handlers with utoipa (OpenAPI), which in turn drives the wallet's generated TypeScript client — one source of truth, checked for drift in CI.
Quickstart
cp .env.example .env # then fill in DATABASE_URL, JWT_SECRET, node URLs
cargo run # starts the API server
A full self-hosting guide (node requirements, reverse proxy, Tor admin onion,
backups) will live in docs/ as it stabilises.
Security
Please report vulnerabilities privately — see SECURITY.md. Do not open public issues for security reports.
License
To be finalized (MIT vs AGPL-3.0-or-later). Until a LICENSE file is added,
all rights are reserved.