jwinterm
54ae9fadac
Optional REGISTRATION_REQUIRE_PAYMENT gate: a new wallet must settle an invoice on an external, non-custodial payment processor before it can register. Pull model — the grant reads the processor's authenticated API as the source of truth, so there is no inbound webhook to secure and a settled invoice cannot be forged over HTTP. Returning wallets and self-hosting bypass it, exactly like the invite and PoW gates. - infra/payment: a pluggable PaymentProvider seam (neutral Invoice / InvoiceStatus / InvoiceRequest) with a BTCPay-compatible first adapter that also serves this project's xmrcheckout/wowcheckout apps + the BTCPay Monero plugin, so "operator picks any coin" costs one adapter. A future ETH/native adapter (BTCPay serves neither) implements the same trait. Only `Settled` grants (unknown status fails safe); the API key rides in a redacting Secret and hostile responses are size-capped. - payment_invoices: invoice<->pubkey_hash binding + atomic single-use consume (UPDATE ... WHERE consumed_at IS NULL AND pubkey_hash=$ RETURNING), so one invoice grants at most one registration and never a different identity. - POST /auth/payment-invoice mints + binds; enforce_payment (bind -> processor `Settled` -> atomic consume) runs beside enforce_invite; payment_invoice_id on the register request. - Fail-closed config: https-in-prod, positive-decimal price, >= 1 confirmation (bars a 0-conf settled-then-double-spent free registration), bounded expiry. /capabilities advertises payment_required + price; OpenAPI + .env.example. Tests: adapter status/speedPolicy mapping + config validation (unit), and L1 binding + atomic single-use (concurrent-consume-one-wins, mis-bind rejected). Reviewed adversarially across payment-integrity, leak/oracle, and config/DoS lenses; the confirmed findings (0-conf, expiry bound, Settled-means-paid-in-full adapter contract, rotation-branch bypass guard) are addressed here.
smirk-backend-core
Open, self-hostable backend for the Smirk non-custodial multi-chain wallet. Rust + Axum + PostgreSQL.
It gives a wallet chain access (balances, history, UTXOs, spend inputs, fee estimation, broadcast), Nostr-native identity, a fiat price feed, and an async Grin slatepack relay — without ever holding a spend key or seed. Run your own; the wallet is backend-agnostic.
Status: v0.3.0 — feature-complete and security-reviewed, but young. The schema/API may still evolve. Run your own chain backends where you can, review the code, and treat early deployments accordingly.
Non-custodial by construction
The server stores public addresses, public keys, and (for Monero/Wownero) incoming view keys only — never a spend key, never a seed. View credentials are forwarded per request to the chain backends that scan with them and are not persisted here. The wallet signs and broadcasts locally; the backend reads chains and relays bytes.
Chains
| Chain | Source | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Bitcoin, Litecoin | Electrum / Fulcrum | reads, fee estimation, broadcast |
| Monero, Wownero | light-wallet-server (LWS) | stateless view-key forwarding |
| Grin | grin-wallet (view-only) + node | rewind_hash scan, broadcast, slatepack relay |
Each chain is independently feature-flagged; a chain whose source isn't configured
is reported enabled: false by /capabilities rather than failing at call time.
API
The HTTP contract is generated from the handlers and committed to
openapi.json — the single source of truth for the API and the
wallet's generated client. A CI gate fails the build on any drift.
Public surface (/api/v1):
- Identity & auth — NIP-98 (Nostr) sign-in + link, wallet-signature auth,
audience-separated JWT sessions, NIP-05 directory (
/.well-known/nostr.json). - Chain access — per-chain balance / history / UTXOs / spend inputs / fee / broadcast.
- Grin relay — non-custodial store-and-forward mailbox for interactive Grin transfers (feature-flagged).
- Capabilities (
/capabilities) — what this instance enables, so the wallet adapts per-instance. - Prices (
/prices) — cached fiat feed, per-feed operator control. - Self-service erasure (
/account/erasure,/account/export) — action-bound, two-phase delete-my-data + export. - Health (
/health) and an optional, default-off public landing (/).
Operator surface
Operator/admin functions live on a separate loopback listener (front it with Tor or an SSH tunnel) — confidentiality by socket, never merged into the public router or OpenAPI.
- Sign-in-with-Smirk admin auth — a NIP-98 signed action over a single-use nonce (AUTHN) + a MAC-protected key allowlist (AUTHZ), composed so a route can't run without both.
- First-run bootstrap — an explicit, MAC-protected latch (no trust-on-first- use); a live deployment adopts as already-bootstrapped; tampering fails closed.
smirk-adminCLI — break-glass key management,create-admin-wallet(zeroized),doctor. Talks to Postgres directly, bypassing the network plane.- Tamper-evident audit — privileged actions are written to a hash-chained audit trail, fail-closed (the state change rolls back if the audit write fails).
Running it
Requires Rust (stable) and PostgreSQL.
cp .env.example .env # then edit: DATABASE_URL + the required secrets
createdb smirk_backend_core # or point DATABASE_URL at an existing database
cargo run --release # migrations run automatically on startup
The server fails closed: it refuses to start on a missing/weak secret or an
inconsistent feature configuration rather than booting with a control silently
defeated. Generate secrets with openssl rand -hex 32. See
.env.example for the full, documented configuration surface.
First admin (headless — the supported bootstrap):
smirk-admin create-admin-wallet --out admin.secret # generates a key, registers the pubkey
# import admin.secret into your NIP-98 signer; it activates on first admin login
Security posture
- Fail-closed configuration — the only place that reads the environment; validates secrets (length + placeholder checks) and feature consistency at boot.
- Identity at rest is peppered —
pubkey_hash/seed_fingerprintare stored as HMACs, so the database is not a seed-existence oracle or a cross-instance linker. - Strict JWTs — HS256 pinned, zero leeway, audience-separated; admin tokens are cryptographically distinct from user tokens.
- Bounded, hardened upstream I/O — TLS with hostname verification, streaming size caps, and per-request timeouts on every external call.
- Adversarially reviewed — every security-critical subsystem was built clean (never ported) and put through a multi-agent adversarial review before landing.
Report vulnerabilities privately — see SECURITY.md. Please do not open public issues for security reports.
Testing
cargo test # unit + doc tests (no database needed)
TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgres://… cargo test --tests # + L1 integration against Postgres
Integration tests self-skip when TEST_DATABASE_URL is unset. They use only
deterministic, non-sensitive test secrets and ephemeral identities — never a
funded or otherwise sensitive wallet seed.
License
MIT © Such Software LLC — run it, embed it, modify it. Built for interop.