jwinterm
4489c1c540
"Sign in with Smirk" for operators. Auth is a NIP-98 signed action over a
single-use nonce (AUTHN) + the MAC'd allowlist (AUTHZ), composed in admin_guard
so a protected route physically cannot run without both. All rejections collapse
to one opaque 401 (no enumeration oracle).
- src/api/admin.rs: admin_guard (verify access token -> live session by jti ->
live MAC-verified, activated allowlist entry) + AdminContext; handlers:
- challenge: mint a 120s admin_login nonce + return the {url, instance_id} the
wallet must bind.
- verify: verify_signed_action (purpose/nonce/descriptor/instance) THEN consume
the nonce (forged sig can't burn a victim's nonce; replay loses the race) ->
authorize (pending key allowed for first login, which activates it) -> mint +
persist session AND the login audit row in ONE tx (fail-closed) -> bump
last_used.
- refresh: re-run FULL authorization before minting (closes the "8h refresh is
the real blast radius" gap) + constant-time refresh-hash bind + rotate jti so
the old access token dies.
- logout: revoke the session; audit. me: guarded whoami.
- admin_router (lib): served on a SEPARATE loopback socket in main (confidentiality
by socket, not middleware); no CORS layer (cross-origin browser calls blocked);
warns if bound non-loopback (hard bind-guard lands with admin posture). Routes
are intentionally absent from the public OpenAPI.
- config: ADMIN_PUBLIC_URL (the signed-action u-tag base; validated when enabled).
AppState.admin_sessions (Some only when enabled). AdminSessionManager.mint_access
(refresh) + db helpers (create_admin_session_audited, touch_admin_key_last_used).
- test harness: admin_router() + request_on(router); 1 L1 test exercising the full
flow end-to-end incl. user-token rejection, replay rejection, jti rotation, and
post-logout revocation.
NOTE (for the upcoming S1 review): admin-login timing-oracle hardening (fixed-cost
allowlist probe + jittered 401 floor, spec §1.3) is deferred — the loopback/onion
exposure + single-use nonce + signature gate are the v1 boundary. Per-pubkey
backoff (§0.5) also pending.
smirk-backend-core
Open, self-hostable backend for the Smirk non-custodial, multi-chain wallet. It provides the chain-access and identity surface a Smirk wallet needs — authentication, per-chain wallet access (Bitcoin, Litecoin, Monero, Wownero, Grin), the Grin slatepack relay, and Nostr-based identity — so anyone can run their own backend and a Smirk wallet can connect to it.
Status: early, under active development. Interfaces and the database schema may change before the first tagged release. Not yet recommended for production self-hosting.
What it is
- Non-custodial. The server never holds spend keys or seeds. It brokers access to blockchain data and relays wallet-to-wallet messages.
- Open core, feature-flagged. Every feature ships in this codebase and is
toggled per deployment; the wallet reads
GET /api/v1/capabilitiesand adapts to what a given backend offers. - Identity via "Sign in with Smirk". Authentication uses a seed-derived Nostr key (NIP-98); the server stores only public keys.
- Privacy first. No PII is required to use it; operator and user privacy are explicit design goals.
Architecture
Rust + Axum, PostgreSQL via sqlx. The public HTTP contract is generated from the handlers with utoipa (OpenAPI), which in turn drives the wallet's generated TypeScript client — one source of truth, checked for drift in CI.
Quickstart
cp .env.example .env # then fill in DATABASE_URL, JWT_SECRET, node URLs
cargo run # starts the API server
A full self-hosting guide (node requirements, reverse proxy, Tor admin onion,
backups) will live in docs/ as it stabilises.
Security
Please report vulnerabilities privately — see SECURITY.md. Do not open public issues for security reports.
License
To be finalized (MIT vs AGPL-3.0-or-later). Until a LICENSE file is added,
all rights are reserved.