mirror of
https://github.com/wownero/wownero.git
synced 2026-11-16 05:13:55 +01:00
Bulletproof aggregated verification and tests
Also constrains bulletproofs to simple rct, for simplicity
This commit is contained in:
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ namespace boost
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a & x.type;
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if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeNull)
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return;
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if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
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if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
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throw boost::archive::archive_exception(boost::archive::archive_exception::other_exception, "Unsupported rct type");
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// a & x.message; message is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the tx data
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// a & x.mixRing; mixRing is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the offsets
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@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ namespace boost
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a & x.type;
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if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeNull)
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return;
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if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
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if (x.type != rct::RCTTypeFull && x.type != rct::RCTTypeSimple && x.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
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throw boost::archive::archive_exception(boost::archive::archive_exception::other_exception, "Unsupported rct type");
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// a & x.message; message is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the tx data
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// a & x.mixRing; mixRing is not serialized, as it can be reconstructed from the offsets
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@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ namespace boost
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if (x.p.rangeSigs.empty())
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a & x.p.bulletproofs;
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a & x.p.MGs;
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if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
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if (x.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
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a & x.p.pseudoOuts;
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}
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}
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@@ -139,18 +139,26 @@ namespace cryptonote
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if (!base_only)
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{
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const bool bulletproof = rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof;
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const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
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if (bulletproof)
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{
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if (rv.p.bulletproofs.size() != tx.vout.size())
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if (rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs) != tx.vout.size())
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("Failed to parse transaction from blob, bad bulletproofs size in tx " << get_transaction_hash(tx));
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return false;
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}
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for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.outPk.size(); ++n)
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size_t idx = 0;
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for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); ++n)
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{
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.resize(1);
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V[0] = rv.outPk[n].mask;
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//rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.resize(1);
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//rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V[0] = rv.outPk[n].mask;
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs[n].L.size() >= 6, false, "Bad bulletproofs L size"); // at least 64 bits
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const size_t n_amounts = rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs[n]);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx + n_amounts <= rv.outPk.size(), false, "Internal error filling out V");
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.resize(n_amounts);
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.clear();
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for (size_t i = 0; i < n_amounts; ++i)
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V[i] = rv.outPk[idx++].mask;
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -2597,7 +2597,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_outputs(const transaction& tx, tx_verification_context
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// from v8, allow bulletproofs
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if (hf_version < 8) {
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const bool bulletproof = tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof || tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof;
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const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(tx.rct_signatures.type);
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if (bulletproof || !tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty())
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{
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MERROR("Bulletproofs are not allowed before v8");
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@@ -2631,7 +2631,7 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr
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rv.message = rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash);
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// mixRing - full and simple store it in opposite ways
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if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
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if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull)
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{
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!pubkeys.empty() && !pubkeys[0].empty(), false, "empty pubkeys");
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rv.mixRing.resize(pubkeys[0].size());
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@@ -2646,7 +2646,7 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr
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}
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}
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}
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else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
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else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
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{
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!pubkeys.empty() && !pubkeys[0].empty(), false, "empty pubkeys");
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rv.mixRing.resize(pubkeys.size());
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@@ -2665,14 +2665,14 @@ bool Blockchain::expand_transaction_2(transaction &tx, const crypto::hash &tx_pr
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}
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// II
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if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
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if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFull)
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{
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rv.p.MGs.resize(1);
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rv.p.MGs[0].II.resize(tx.vin.size());
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for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n)
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rv.p.MGs[0].II[n] = rct::ki2rct(boost::get<txin_to_key>(tx.vin[n]).k_image);
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}
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else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
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else if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
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{
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == tx.vin.size(), false, "Bad MGs size");
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for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vin.size(); ++n)
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@@ -2938,7 +2938,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
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return false;
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}
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case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
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case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
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case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof:
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{
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// check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not
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{
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@@ -2996,7 +2996,6 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
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break;
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}
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case rct::RCTTypeFull:
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case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
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{
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// check all this, either reconstructed (so should really pass), or not
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{
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@@ -3061,7 +3060,7 @@ bool Blockchain::check_tx_inputs(transaction& tx, tx_verification_context &tvc,
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}
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// for bulletproofs, check they're only multi-output after v8
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if (rv.type == rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
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if (rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type))
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{
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if (hf_version < 8)
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{
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@@ -692,26 +692,142 @@ namespace cryptonote
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return false;
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}
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// resolve outPk references in rct txes
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// outPk aren't the only thing that need resolving for a fully resolved tx,
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// but outPk (1) are needed now to check range proof semantics, and
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// (2) do not need access to the blockchain to find data
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if (tx.version >= 2)
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{
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rct::rctSig &rv = tx.rct_signatures;
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if (rv.outPk.size() != tx.vout.size())
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Bad outPk size in tx " << tx_hash << ", rejected");
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tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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return false;
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}
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for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.rct_signatures.outPk.size(); ++n)
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rv.outPk[n].dest = rct::pk2rct(boost::get<txout_to_key>(tx.vout[n].target).key);
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const bool bulletproof = rct::is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
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if (bulletproof)
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{
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if (rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs) != tx.vout.size())
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Bad bulletproofs size in tx " << tx_hash << ", rejected");
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tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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return false;
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}
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size_t idx = 0;
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for (size_t n = 0; n < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); ++n)
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{
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.bulletproofs[n].L.size() >= 6, false, "Bad bulletproofs L size"); // at least 64 bits
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const size_t n_amounts = rct::n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs[n]);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx + n_amounts <= rv.outPk.size(), false, "Internal error filling out V");
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.clear();
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for (size_t i = 0; i < n_amounts; ++i)
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rv.p.bulletproofs[n].V.push_back(rv.outPk[idx++].mask);
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}
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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void core::set_semantics_failed(const crypto::hash &tx_hash)
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Failed to check tx " << tx_hash << " semantic, rejected");
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bad_semantics_txes_lock.lock();
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bad_semantics_txes[0].insert(tx_hash);
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if (bad_semantics_txes[0].size() >= BAD_SEMANTICS_TXES_MAX_SIZE)
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{
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std::swap(bad_semantics_txes[0], bad_semantics_txes[1]);
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bad_semantics_txes[0].clear();
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}
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bad_semantics_txes_lock.unlock();
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}
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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bool core::handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> &tx_info, bool keeped_by_block)
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{
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bool ret = true;
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if (keeped_by_block && get_blockchain_storage().is_within_compiled_block_hash_area())
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{
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MTRACE("Skipping semantics check for tx kept by block in embedded hash area");
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}
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else if(!check_tx_semantic(tx, keeped_by_block))
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("WRONG TRANSACTION BLOB, Failed to check tx " << tx_hash << " semantic, rejected");
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tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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bad_semantics_txes_lock.lock();
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bad_semantics_txes[0].insert(tx_hash);
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if (bad_semantics_txes[0].size() >= BAD_SEMANTICS_TXES_MAX_SIZE)
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{
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std::swap(bad_semantics_txes[0], bad_semantics_txes[1]);
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bad_semantics_txes[0].clear();
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}
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bad_semantics_txes_lock.unlock();
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return false;
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return true;
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}
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return true;
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std::vector<const rct::rctSig*> rvv;
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for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_info.size(); ++n)
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{
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if (!check_tx_semantic(*tx_info[n].tx, keeped_by_block))
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{
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set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
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tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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tx_info[n].result = false;
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continue;
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}
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if (tx_info[n].tx->version < 2)
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continue;
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const rct::rctSig &rv = tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures;
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switch (rv.type) {
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case rct::RCTTypeNull:
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// coinbase should not come here, so we reject for all other types
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MERROR_VER("Unexpected Null rctSig type");
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set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
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tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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tx_info[n].result = false;
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break;
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case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
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if (!rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rv))
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{
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MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
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set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
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tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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tx_info[n].result = false;
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break;
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}
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break;
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case rct::RCTTypeFull:
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if (!rct::verRct(rv, true))
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{
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MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
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set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
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tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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tx_info[n].result = false;
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break;
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}
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break;
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case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof:
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rvv.push_back(&rv); // delayed batch verification
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break;
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default:
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MERROR_VER("Unknown rct type: " << rv.type);
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set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
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tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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tx_info[n].result = false;
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break;
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}
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}
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if (!rvv.empty() && !rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rvv))
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{
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LOG_PRINT_L1("One transaction among this group has bad semantics, verifying one at a time");
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ret = false;
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const bool assumed_bad = rvv.size() == 1; // if there's only one tx, it must be the bad one
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for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_info.size(); ++n)
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{
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if (!tx_info[n].result)
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continue;
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if (tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures.type != rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)
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continue;
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if (assumed_bad || !rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(tx_info[n].tx->rct_signatures))
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{
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set_semantics_failed(tx_info[n].tx_hash);
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tx_info[n].tvc.m_verifivation_failed = true;
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tx_info[n].result = false;
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}
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}
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}
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return ret;
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}
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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bool core::handle_incoming_txs(const std::vector<blobdata>& tx_blobs, std::vector<tx_verification_context>& tvc, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay)
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@@ -769,6 +885,16 @@ namespace cryptonote
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}
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waiter.wait(&tpool);
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std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> tx_info;
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tx_info.reserve(tx_blobs.size());
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for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_blobs.size(); i++) {
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if (!results[i].res)
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continue;
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tx_info.push_back({&results[i].tx, results[i].hash, tvc[i], results[i].res});
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}
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if (!tx_info.empty())
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handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(tx_info, keeped_by_block);
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bool ok = true;
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it = tx_blobs.begin();
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for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_blobs.size(); i++, ++it) {
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@@ -886,36 +1012,6 @@ namespace cryptonote
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return false;
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}
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if (tx.version >= 2)
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{
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const rct::rctSig &rv = tx.rct_signatures;
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switch (rv.type) {
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case rct::RCTTypeNull:
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// coinbase should not come here, so we reject for all other types
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MERROR_VER("Unexpected Null rctSig type");
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return false;
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case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
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case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
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if (!rct::verRctSemanticsSimple(rv))
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{
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MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
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return false;
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}
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break;
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case rct::RCTTypeFull:
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case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
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if (!rct::verRct(rv, true))
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{
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MERROR_VER("rct signature semantics check failed");
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return false;
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}
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break;
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default:
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MERROR_VER("Unknown rct type: " << rv.type);
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return false;
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}
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}
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return true;
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}
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//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@@ -864,9 +864,12 @@ namespace cryptonote
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* @return true if all the checks pass, otherwise false
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*/
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bool check_tx_semantic(const transaction& tx, bool keeped_by_block) const;
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void set_semantics_failed(const crypto::hash &tx_hash);
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bool handle_incoming_tx_pre(const blobdata& tx_blob, tx_verification_context& tvc, cryptonote::transaction &tx, crypto::hash &tx_hash, crypto::hash &tx_prefixt_hash, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay);
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bool handle_incoming_tx_post(const blobdata& tx_blob, tx_verification_context& tvc, cryptonote::transaction &tx, crypto::hash &tx_hash, crypto::hash &tx_prefixt_hash, bool keeped_by_block, bool relayed, bool do_not_relay);
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struct tx_verification_batch_info { const cryptonote::transaction *tx; crypto::hash tx_hash; tx_verification_context &tvc; bool &result; };
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bool handle_incoming_tx_accumulated_batch(std::vector<tx_verification_batch_info> &tx_info, bool keeped_by_block);
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/**
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* @copydoc miner::on_block_chain_update
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@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
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// the non-simple version is slightly smaller, but assumes all real inputs
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// are on the same index, so can only be used if there just one ring.
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bool use_simple_rct = sources.size() > 1;
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bool use_simple_rct = sources.size() > 1 || range_proof_type == rct::RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof || range_proof_type == rct::RangeProofBulletproof;
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if (!use_simple_rct)
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{
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@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
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if (use_simple_rct)
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tx.rct_signatures = rct::genRctSimple(rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash), inSk, destinations, inamounts, outamounts, amount_in - amount_out, mixRing, amount_keys, msout ? &kLRki : NULL, msout, index, outSk, range_proof_type, hwdev);
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else
|
||||
tx.rct_signatures = rct::genRct(rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash), inSk, destinations, outamounts, mixRing, amount_keys, msout ? &kLRki[0] : NULL, msout, sources[0].real_output, outSk, range_proof_type, hwdev); // same index assumption
|
||||
tx.rct_signatures = rct::genRct(rct::hash2rct(tx_prefix_hash), inSk, destinations, outamounts, mixRing, amount_keys, msout ? &kLRki[0] : NULL, msout, sources[0].real_output, outSk, hwdev); // same index assumption
|
||||
memwipe(inSk.data(), inSk.size() * sizeof(rct::ctkey));
|
||||
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(tx.vout.size() == outSk.size(), false, "outSk size does not match vout");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ namespace hw {
|
||||
this->exchange();
|
||||
|
||||
//pseudoOuts
|
||||
if ((type == rct::RCTTypeSimple) || (type == rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)) {
|
||||
if ((type == rct::RCTTypeSimple) || (type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof)) {
|
||||
for ( i = 0; i < inputs_size; i++) {
|
||||
offset = set_command_header(INS_VALIDATE, 0x01, i+2);
|
||||
//options
|
||||
|
||||
+57
-76
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
hashes.push_back(hash2rct(h));
|
||||
|
||||
keyV kv;
|
||||
if (rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
|
||||
if (rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
kv.reserve((6*2+9) * rv.p.bulletproofs.size());
|
||||
for (const auto &p: rv.p.bulletproofs)
|
||||
@@ -651,8 +651,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
// must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
|
||||
// Note: For txn fees, the last index in the amounts vector should contain that
|
||||
// Thus the amounts vector will be "one" longer than the destinations vectort
|
||||
rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev) {
|
||||
const bool bulletproof = range_proof_type != RangeProofBorromean;
|
||||
rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, hw::device &hwdev) {
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amounts.size() == destinations.size() || amounts.size() == destinations.size() + 1, "Different number of amounts/destinations");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(amount_keys.size() == destinations.size(), "Different number of amount_keys/destinations");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(index < mixRing.size(), "Bad index into mixRing");
|
||||
@@ -662,11 +661,10 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES((kLRki && msout) || (!kLRki && !msout), "Only one of kLRki/msout is present");
|
||||
|
||||
rctSig rv;
|
||||
rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeFullBulletproof : RCTTypeFull;
|
||||
rv.type = RCTTypeFull;
|
||||
rv.message = message;
|
||||
rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
if (!bulletproof)
|
||||
rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
|
||||
size_t i = 0;
|
||||
@@ -675,46 +673,11 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < destinations.size(); i++) {
|
||||
//add destination to sig
|
||||
rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]);
|
||||
//compute range proof (bulletproofs are done later)
|
||||
if (!bulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]);
|
||||
//compute range proof
|
||||
rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, amounts[i]);
|
||||
#ifdef DBG
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rv.p.bulletproofs.clear();
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
std::vector<uint64_t> proof_amounts;
|
||||
size_t amounts_proved = 0;
|
||||
while (amounts_proved < amounts.size())
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t batch_size = 1;
|
||||
if (range_proof_type == RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof)
|
||||
while (batch_size * 2 + amounts_proved <= amounts.size())
|
||||
batch_size *= 2;
|
||||
rct::keyV C, masks;
|
||||
std::vector<uint64_t> batch_amounts(batch_size);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
|
||||
batch_amounts[i] = amounts[i + amounts_proved];
|
||||
rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts));
|
||||
#ifdef DBG
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
rv.outPk[i + amounts_proved].mask = C[i];
|
||||
outSk[i + amounts_proved].mask = masks[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
amounts_proved += batch_size;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < outSk.size(); ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
//mask amount and mask
|
||||
rv.ecdhInfo[i].mask = copy(outSk[i].mask);
|
||||
rv.ecdhInfo[i].amount = d2h(amounts[i]);
|
||||
@@ -744,7 +707,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
ctkeyM mixRing;
|
||||
ctkeyV outSk;
|
||||
tie(mixRing, index) = populateFromBlockchain(inPk, mixin);
|
||||
return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, kLRki, msout, index, outSk, RangeProofBorromean, hwdev);
|
||||
return genRct(message, inSk, destinations, amounts, mixRing, amount_keys, kLRki, msout, index, outSk, hwdev);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//RCT simple
|
||||
@@ -766,35 +729,61 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rctSig rv;
|
||||
rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof : RCTTypeSimple;
|
||||
rv.type = bulletproof ? RCTTypeBulletproof : RCTTypeSimple;
|
||||
rv.message = message;
|
||||
rv.outPk.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
rv.p.bulletproofs.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
else
|
||||
if (!bulletproof)
|
||||
rv.p.rangeSigs.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
rv.ecdhInfo.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
|
||||
size_t i;
|
||||
keyV masks(destinations.size()); //sk mask..
|
||||
outSk.resize(destinations.size());
|
||||
key sumout = zero();
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < destinations.size(); i++) {
|
||||
|
||||
//add destination to sig
|
||||
rv.outPk[i].dest = copy(destinations[i]);
|
||||
//compute range proof
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
rv.p.bulletproofs[i] = proveRangeBulletproof(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]);
|
||||
else
|
||||
if (!bulletproof)
|
||||
rv.p.rangeSigs[i] = proveRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, outSk[i].mask, outamounts[i]);
|
||||
#ifdef DBG
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
|
||||
else
|
||||
if (!bulletproof)
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]), "verRange failed on newly created proof");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rv.p.bulletproofs.clear();
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
std::vector<uint64_t> proof_amounts;
|
||||
size_t n_amounts = outamounts.size();
|
||||
size_t amounts_proved = 0;
|
||||
while (amounts_proved < n_amounts)
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t batch_size = 1;
|
||||
if (range_proof_type == RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof)
|
||||
while (batch_size * 2 + amounts_proved <= n_amounts && batch_size * 2 <= 16)
|
||||
batch_size *= 2;
|
||||
rct::keyV C, masks;
|
||||
std::vector<uint64_t> batch_amounts(batch_size);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
|
||||
batch_amounts[i] = outamounts[i + amounts_proved];
|
||||
rv.p.bulletproofs.push_back(proveRangeBulletproof(C, masks, batch_amounts));
|
||||
#ifdef DBG
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs.back()), "verBulletproof failed on newly created proof");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < batch_size; ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
rv.outPk[i + amounts_proved].mask = C[i];
|
||||
outSk[i + amounts_proved].mask = masks[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
amounts_proved += batch_size;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
key sumout = zero();
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < outSk.size(); ++i)
|
||||
{
|
||||
sc_add(sumout.bytes, outSk[i].mask.bytes, sumout.bytes);
|
||||
|
||||
//mask amount and mask
|
||||
@@ -857,14 +846,10 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
// must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
|
||||
bool verRct(const rctSig & rv, bool semantics) {
|
||||
PERF_TIMER(verRct);
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig");
|
||||
const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "verRct called on non-full rctSig");
|
||||
if (semantics)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == n_bulletproof_amounts(rv.p.bulletproofs), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and bulletproofs");
|
||||
else
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.p.rangeSigs.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.p.rangeSigs");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), false, "Mismatched sizes of outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == 1, false, "full rctSig has not one MG");
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -879,14 +864,10 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
if (semantics) {
|
||||
tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance();
|
||||
tools::threadpool::waiter waiter;
|
||||
std::deque<bool> results(bulletproof ? rv.p.bulletproofs.size() : rv.outPk.size(), false);
|
||||
std::deque<bool> results(rv.outPk.size(), false);
|
||||
DP("range proofs verified?");
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.p.bulletproofs.size(); i++)
|
||||
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verBulletproof(rv.p.bulletproofs[i]); });
|
||||
else
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++)
|
||||
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); });
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.outPk.size(); i++)
|
||||
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i] { results[i] = verRange(rv.outPk[i].mask, rv.p.rangeSigs[i]); });
|
||||
waiter.wait(&tpool);
|
||||
|
||||
for (size_t i = 0; i < results.size(); ++i) {
|
||||
@@ -940,7 +921,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
{
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rvp, false, "rctSig pointer is NULL");
|
||||
const rctSig &rv = *rvp;
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "verRctSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
|
||||
const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -1041,7 +1022,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
{
|
||||
PERF_TIMER(verRctNonSemanticsSimple);
|
||||
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "verRctNonSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "verRctNonSemanticsSimple called on non simple rctSig");
|
||||
const bool bulletproof = is_rct_bulletproof(rv.type);
|
||||
// semantics check is early, and mixRing/MGs aren't resolved yet
|
||||
if (bulletproof)
|
||||
@@ -1101,7 +1082,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
// uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment
|
||||
// must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
|
||||
xmr_amount decodeRct(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key & mask, hw::device &hwdev) {
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull, false, "decodeRct called on non-full rctSig");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1129,7 +1110,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
xmr_amount decodeRctSimple(const rctSig & rv, const key & sk, unsigned int i, key &mask, hw::device &hwdev) {
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof, false, "decodeRct called on non simple rctSig");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(i < rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Bad index");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(rv.outPk.size() == rv.ecdhInfo.size(), "Mismatched sizes of rv.outPk and rv.ecdhInfo");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1157,12 +1138,12 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool signMultisig(rctSig &rv, const std::vector<unsigned int> &indices, const keyV &k, const multisig_out &msout, const key &secret_key) {
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof || rv.type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof,
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeSimple || rv.type == RCTTypeBulletproof,
|
||||
false, "unsupported rct type");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(indices.size() == k.size(), false, "Mismatched k/indices sizes");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == rv.p.MGs.size(), false, "Mismatched k/MGs size");
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(k.size() == msout.c.size(), false, "Mismatched k/msout.c size");
|
||||
if (rv.type == RCTTypeFull || rv.type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
|
||||
if (rv.type == RCTTypeFull)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.p.MGs.size() == 1, false, "MGs not a single element");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
//decodeRct: (c.f. https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 5.1.1)
|
||||
// uses the attached ecdh info to find the amounts represented by each output commitment
|
||||
// must know the destination private key to find the correct amount, else will return a random number
|
||||
rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev);
|
||||
rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const ctkeyM &mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, unsigned int index, ctkeyV &outSk, hw::device &hwdev);
|
||||
rctSig genRct(const key &message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV & inPk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & amounts, const keyV &amount_keys, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, const int mixin, hw::device &hwdev);
|
||||
rctSig genRctSimple(const key & message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const ctkeyV & inPk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & inamounts, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & outamounts, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<multisig_kLRki> *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, xmr_amount txnFee, unsigned int mixin, hw::device &hwdev);
|
||||
rctSig genRctSimple(const key & message, const ctkeyV & inSk, const keyV & destinations, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & inamounts, const std::vector<xmr_amount> & outamounts, xmr_amount txnFee, const ctkeyM & mixRing, const keyV &amount_keys, const std::vector<multisig_kLRki> *kLRki, multisig_out *msout, const std::vector<unsigned int> & index, ctkeyV &outSk, RangeProofType range_proof_type, hw::device &hwdev);
|
||||
|
||||
+15
-4
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
|
||||
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
|
||||
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
|
||||
#include "misc_log_ex.h"
|
||||
#include "rctTypes.h"
|
||||
using namespace crypto;
|
||||
using namespace std;
|
||||
@@ -214,7 +215,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
switch (type)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case RCTTypeSimple:
|
||||
case RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
|
||||
case RCTTypeBulletproof:
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
@@ -225,19 +226,29 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch (type)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
|
||||
case RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
|
||||
case RCTTypeBulletproof:
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(proof.L.size() >= 6, 0, "Invalid bulletproof L size");
|
||||
return 1 << (proof.L.size() - 6);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t n = 0;
|
||||
for (const Bulletproof &proof: proofs)
|
||||
n += proof.V.size();
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t n2 = n_bulletproof_amounts(proof);
|
||||
if (n2 == 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
n += n2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return n;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+10
-10
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
END_SERIALIZE()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const Bulletproof &proof);
|
||||
size_t n_bulletproof_amounts(const std::vector<Bulletproof> &proofs);
|
||||
|
||||
//A container to hold all signatures necessary for RingCT
|
||||
@@ -226,8 +227,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
RCTTypeNull = 0,
|
||||
RCTTypeFull = 1,
|
||||
RCTTypeSimple = 2,
|
||||
RCTTypeFullBulletproof = 3,
|
||||
RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof = 4,
|
||||
RCTTypeBulletproof = 3,
|
||||
};
|
||||
enum RangeProofType { RangeProofBorromean, RangeProofBulletproof, RangeProofMultiOutputBulletproof };
|
||||
struct rctSigBase {
|
||||
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
FIELD(type)
|
||||
if (type == RCTTypeNull)
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeFullBulletproof && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
|
||||
if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
VARINT_FIELD(txnFee)
|
||||
// inputs/outputs not saved, only here for serialization help
|
||||
@@ -307,9 +307,9 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (type == RCTTypeNull)
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeFullBulletproof && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
|
||||
if (type != RCTTypeFull && type != RCTTypeSimple && type != RCTTypeBulletproof)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
if (type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof || type == RCTTypeFullBulletproof)
|
||||
if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ar.tag("bp");
|
||||
ar.begin_array();
|
||||
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
ar.begin_array();
|
||||
// we keep a byte for size of MGs, because we don't know whether this is
|
||||
// a simple or full rct signature, and it's starting to annoy the hell out of me
|
||||
size_t mg_elements = (type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) ? inputs : 1;
|
||||
size_t mg_elements = (type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeBulletproof) ? inputs : 1;
|
||||
PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mg_elements, MGs);
|
||||
if (MGs.size() != mg_elements)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
for (size_t j = 0; j < mixin + 1; ++j)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ar.begin_array();
|
||||
size_t mg_ss2_elements = ((type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof) ? 1 : inputs) + 1;
|
||||
size_t mg_ss2_elements = ((type == RCTTypeSimple || type == RCTTypeBulletproof) ? 1 : inputs) + 1;
|
||||
PREPARE_CUSTOM_VECTOR_SERIALIZATION(mg_ss2_elements, MGs[i].ss[j]);
|
||||
if (MGs[i].ss[j].size() != mg_ss2_elements)
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
ar.delimit_array();
|
||||
}
|
||||
ar.end_array();
|
||||
if (type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof)
|
||||
if (type == RCTTypeBulletproof)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ar.tag("pseudoOuts");
|
||||
ar.begin_array();
|
||||
@@ -416,12 +416,12 @@ namespace rct {
|
||||
|
||||
keyV& get_pseudo_outs()
|
||||
{
|
||||
return type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
|
||||
return type == RCTTypeBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
keyV const& get_pseudo_outs() const
|
||||
{
|
||||
return type == RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
|
||||
return type == RCTTypeBulletproof ? p.pseudoOuts : pseudoOuts;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1142,10 +1142,9 @@ static uint64_t decodeRct(const rct::rctSig & rv, const crypto::key_derivation &
|
||||
switch (rv.type)
|
||||
{
|
||||
case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
|
||||
case rct::RCTTypeSimpleBulletproof:
|
||||
case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof:
|
||||
return rct::decodeRctSimple(rv, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), i, mask, hwdev);
|
||||
case rct::RCTTypeFull:
|
||||
case rct::RCTTypeFullBulletproof:
|
||||
return rct::decodeRct(rv, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), i, mask, hwdev);
|
||||
default:
|
||||
LOG_ERROR("Unsupported rct type: " << rv.type);
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user