Files
smirk-backend-core/tests/common
jwinterm 4489c1c540 feat(admin): admin auth flow + guard + loopback plane [operator §1.1-1.4, §2.1]
"Sign in with Smirk" for operators. Auth is a NIP-98 signed action over a
single-use nonce (AUTHN) + the MAC'd allowlist (AUTHZ), composed in admin_guard
so a protected route physically cannot run without both. All rejections collapse
to one opaque 401 (no enumeration oracle).

- src/api/admin.rs: admin_guard (verify access token -> live session by jti ->
  live MAC-verified, activated allowlist entry) + AdminContext; handlers:
  - challenge: mint a 120s admin_login nonce + return the {url, instance_id} the
    wallet must bind.
  - verify: verify_signed_action (purpose/nonce/descriptor/instance) THEN consume
    the nonce (forged sig can't burn a victim's nonce; replay loses the race) ->
    authorize (pending key allowed for first login, which activates it) -> mint +
    persist session AND the login audit row in ONE tx (fail-closed) -> bump
    last_used.
  - refresh: re-run FULL authorization before minting (closes the "8h refresh is
    the real blast radius" gap) + constant-time refresh-hash bind + rotate jti so
    the old access token dies.
  - logout: revoke the session; audit. me: guarded whoami.
- admin_router (lib): served on a SEPARATE loopback socket in main (confidentiality
  by socket, not middleware); no CORS layer (cross-origin browser calls blocked);
  warns if bound non-loopback (hard bind-guard lands with admin posture). Routes
  are intentionally absent from the public OpenAPI.
- config: ADMIN_PUBLIC_URL (the signed-action u-tag base; validated when enabled).
  AppState.admin_sessions (Some only when enabled). AdminSessionManager.mint_access
  (refresh) + db helpers (create_admin_session_audited, touch_admin_key_last_used).
- test harness: admin_router() + request_on(router); 1 L1 test exercising the full
  flow end-to-end incl. user-token rejection, replay rejection, jti rotation, and
  post-logout revocation.

NOTE (for the upcoming S1 review): admin-login timing-oracle hardening (fixed-cost
allowlist probe + jittered 401 floor, spec §1.3) is deferred — the loopback/onion
exposure + single-use nonce + signature gate are the v1 boundary. Per-pubkey
backoff (§0.5) also pending.
2026-06-26 06:36:55 -04:00
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