mirror of
https://github.com/Such-Software/smirk-backend-core.git
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First of the operator-configurable registration gates (PoW-priced restore and pay-to-register follow). A NEW wallet must present a valid invite code when REGISTRATION_REQUIRE_INVITE is on; returning wallets and self-hosting bypass it, and the active gates are advertised via /capabilities so the wallet shapes onboarding. - migration + db: invite_codes table storing only sha256(code) (128-bit codes, no pepper needed). Redemption is an atomic single-statement claim (UPDATE ... WHERE used_at IS NULL RETURNING) — single-use even under concurrent submission (L1 test fires 8 concurrent claims; exactly one wins). - core::invite: generate (base58, 128-bit) + sha256 hash. - enforce_invite in extension_register, mirroring enforce_pow (returning bypass; ONE literal error for not-found/used/expired — never an oracle). - RegistrationConfig.require_invite + RegistrationCapability in /capabilities. - smirk-admin mint-invite --count/--label (prints raw codes once; stores hashes). - L1 tests (single-use + concurrency race), .env.example, OpenAPI (drift clean).
1012 lines
39 KiB
Rust
1012 lines
39 KiB
Rust
//! Configuration: the single source of environment-driven settings.
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//!
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//! [`Config::from_env`] is the ONLY place that reads `std::env`; every other
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//! module receives typed config. `from_env` calls [`Config::validate`], which
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//! **fails closed**: the server refuses to start on a weak or placeholder
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//! secret, or an inconsistent feature configuration, rather than booting and
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//! logging success while a security control is silently defeated.
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//!
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//! Secrets are never logged, never placed in defaults, and never emitted in the
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//! OpenAPI spec. Structs that hold secrets deliberately do not derive `Debug`.
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use std::env;
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use std::net::IpAddr;
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use std::str::FromStr;
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use ipnetwork::IpNetwork;
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use crate::error::AppError;
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fn cfg_err(msg: impl Into<String>) -> AppError {
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AppError::ConfigError(msg.into())
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}
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/// Substrings we refuse to accept as real secrets in production.
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const PLACEHOLDERS: &[&str] = &[
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"change_me",
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"changeme",
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"your-",
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"example",
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"placeholder",
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"dev-",
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"xxxx",
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"0000000000",
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];
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fn looks_placeholder(s: &str) -> bool {
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let l = s.to_lowercase();
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PLACEHOLDERS.iter().any(|p| l.contains(p))
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}
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// ── env helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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/// Non-empty env value, or `None`.
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fn env_opt(key: &str) -> Option<String> {
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env::var(key).ok().filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
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}
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fn env_or(key: &str, default: &str) -> String {
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env_opt(key).unwrap_or_else(|| default.to_string())
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}
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fn env_bool(key: &str, default: bool) -> bool {
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match env::var(key) {
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Ok(v) => matches!(v.to_lowercase().as_str(), "1" | "true" | "yes" | "on"),
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Err(_) => default,
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}
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}
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/// Parse a typed value. Errors if the var is *present but unparseable* (so a
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/// `doctor` preflight can distinguish "set but invalid" from "unset"); falls
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/// back to `default` only when truly absent/empty.
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fn env_parse<T: FromStr>(key: &str, default: T) -> Result<T, AppError> {
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match env_opt(key) {
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Some(v) => v
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.parse()
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.map_err(|_| cfg_err(format!("{key} is set but not a valid value"))),
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None => Ok(default),
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}
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}
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fn env_list(key: &str) -> Vec<String> {
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env_opt(key)
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.map(|s| {
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s.split(',')
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.map(|x| x.trim().to_string())
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.filter(|x| !x.is_empty())
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.collect()
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})
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.unwrap_or_default()
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}
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/// Parse a comma-separated list of CIDRs or bare IPs into networks.
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fn parse_networks(key: &str) -> Result<Vec<IpNetwork>, AppError> {
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let mut out = Vec::new();
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for tok in env_list(key) {
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let net = IpNetwork::from_str(&tok)
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.or_else(|_| IpAddr::from_str(&tok).map(IpNetwork::from))
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.map_err(|_| cfg_err(format!("{key} contains an invalid CIDR/IP: {tok}")))?;
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out.push(net);
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}
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Ok(out)
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}
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// ── config tree ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
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pub enum DeploymentMode {
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/// Single instance (default). In-memory challenge state is permitted.
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Single,
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/// Load-balanced fleet. Requires shared/stateless challenge state.
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Fleet,
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}
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/// Top-level application configuration. Does not derive `Debug` (holds secrets).
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct Config {
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pub server_host: String,
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pub server_port: u16,
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pub deployment_mode: DeploymentMode,
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pub environment: String,
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pub database_url: String,
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pub auth: AuthConfig,
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pub identity: IdentityConfig,
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pub secrets: SecretConfig,
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/// Networks whose `X-Forwarded-For` is trusted. Empty (default) means the
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/// real TCP peer is always used for rate-limiting and audit IPs.
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pub trusted_proxies: Vec<IpNetwork>,
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/// Browser origins allowed by CORS (e.g. the web wallet). Empty (default)
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/// allows any origin — safe here because auth is a Bearer token, not cookies,
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/// so no ambient credentials ride a cross-origin request.
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pub cors_allowed_origins: Vec<String>,
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pub features: FeatureFlags,
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pub chains: ChainConfig,
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pub pow: PowConfig,
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pub admin: AdminConfig,
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pub landing: LandingConfig,
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pub retention: RetentionConfig,
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pub restore: RestoreConfig,
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pub registration: RegistrationConfig,
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}
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct AuthConfig {
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/// HS256 signing key. Length-checked (>= 32 bytes) and placeholder-checked.
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pub jwt_secret: String,
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pub jwt_expiry_hours: u64,
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}
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct IdentityConfig {
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/// Public absolute API base URL (e.g. `https://backend.example.org/api/v1`).
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/// Required when Nostr identity is enabled: it is the canonical value the
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/// NIP-98 `u` tag is verified against — never the request `Host` header.
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pub public_api_url: Option<String>,
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}
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/// HMAC peppers and salts. Fail-closed: required and length-checked. These make
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/// stored fingerprints non-reproducible from a candidate seed and unlink IPs.
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct SecretConfig {
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pub seed_fingerprint_pepper: String,
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pub refresh_token_pepper: String,
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pub ip_salt: String,
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}
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/// Assets the price feed can quote. Source of truth for which `PRICES_ASSETS`
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/// values are accepted; the provider mapping (symbol→coin id) lives in
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/// `infra::prices` and a test there asserts it covers exactly this set.
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pub const SUPPORTED_PRICE_ASSETS: &[&str] = &["btc", "ltc", "xmr", "wow", "grin"];
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/// Fiat (and crypto-denominated) currencies the price feed may quote in. A
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/// curated allowlist so a `PRICES_CURRENCY` typo fails closed at startup rather
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/// than booting a feed that advertises `prices:true` but serves nothing (the
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/// provider returns empty quotes for an unknown currency).
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pub const SUPPORTED_PRICE_CURRENCIES: &[&str] = &[
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"usd", "eur", "gbp", "jpy", "cny", "aud", "cad", "chf", "btc",
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];
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct FeatureFlags {
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pub chains: ChainFlags,
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/// Master switch for the price feed. When off, `/prices` is `404` and no
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/// upstream is ever contacted.
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pub prices: bool,
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pub prices_provider: String,
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pub prices_interval_secs: u64,
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/// Per-feed control: exactly which assets this instance quotes. Unset =
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/// all supported; an explicit (possibly empty) `PRICES_ASSETS` list narrows
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/// it — so an operator can serve a subset or none at all.
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pub prices_assets: Vec<String>,
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/// Fiat currency the feed quotes in (e.g. `"usd"`).
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pub prices_currency: String,
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/// Parked feature; off by default.
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pub tips: bool,
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/// Nostr-native identity (NIP-98 login/link, NIP-05 directory).
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pub nostr_identity: bool,
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/// Grin slatepack relay (async store-and-forward mailbox for interactive
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/// Grin transfers). A non-custodial encrypted mailbox; operators can disable
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/// it independently of Grin chain access.
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pub grin_relay: bool,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
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pub struct ChainFlags {
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pub btc: bool,
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pub ltc: bool,
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pub xmr: bool,
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pub wow: bool,
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pub grin: bool,
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}
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct ChainConfig {
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pub btc: UtxoConfig,
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pub ltc: UtxoConfig,
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pub xmr: LwsConfig,
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pub wow: LwsConfig,
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pub grin: GrinConfig,
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}
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/// Bitcoin/Litecoin chain access via Electrum/Fulcrum. The backend runs no
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/// BTC/LTC node — reads, fee estimation, and broadcast all go through Electrum.
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/// (A self-hosted Fulcrum relays broadcasts to its own backing node, so no
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/// separate Core-RPC path is needed; a future MWEB/node provider would slot in
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/// at the provider seam rather than extending this config.)
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct UtxoConfig {
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pub network: String,
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pub electrum_primary: Option<String>,
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pub electrum_fallbacks: Vec<String>,
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}
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/// Monero/Wownero daemon + light-wallet-server configuration.
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct LwsConfig {
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pub lws_url: String,
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pub lws_admin_url: String,
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pub lws_admin_key: String,
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pub daemon_url: String,
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}
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct GrinConfig {
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pub owner_api_url: String,
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pub owner_api_secret: String,
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pub wallet_password: String,
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pub foreign_api_url: String,
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pub node_api_url: String,
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pub node_api_user: String,
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pub node_api_pass: String,
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pub node_foreign_api_url: String,
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pub node_foreign_api_secret: String,
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}
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/// Proof-of-work signup gate (ALTCHA). Feature-gated; when enabled the HMAC key
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/// is required (no source-visible fallback).
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct PowConfig {
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pub enabled: bool,
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pub hmac_key: String,
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pub required: bool,
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pub cost: u64,
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/// Lowercase hex pubkey hashes that always require PoW (opt-in testing).
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pub required_for_pubkeys: Vec<String>,
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}
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/// Admin surface. Default posture is loopback/Tor; allowlist mutation is
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/// CLI/loopback-only in v1. Only public keys are stored — never a seed.
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct AdminConfig {
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pub enabled: bool,
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pub bind: String,
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/// Absolute base URL the operator's wallet reaches the admin plane at (the
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/// value the signed-action `u` tag is verified against — never the Host
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/// header). Loopback by default; a Tor onion / SSH-tunnel URL in production.
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pub public_url: String,
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pub jwt_secret: String,
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/// MAC secret protecting admin/setup trust anchors against DB tampering.
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pub key_integrity_secret: String,
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pub pubkeys: Vec<String>,
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pub max_keys: u32,
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pub pending_key_ttl_days: u32,
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/// Allow the admin plane to bind a non-loopback address (default false →
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/// startup refuses a public bind; confidentiality is by socket).
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pub allow_public_bind: bool,
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/// Tor onion host the admin plane is reached at (added to the Host allowlist;
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/// never logged or surfaced publicly).
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pub onion: Option<String>,
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}
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/// Public landing page. Off by default; full + per-field tunable when enabled.
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct LandingConfig {
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pub enabled: bool,
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/// Operator free text (HTML-escaped on render). `None` = omitted.
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pub title: Option<String>,
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/// Emit a coarse (major.minor) version. Default off (version is recon).
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pub expose_version: bool,
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/// Emit the enabled chain symbols. Default off.
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pub expose_chains: bool,
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/// Emit `price_feed.enabled`. Default off.
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pub expose_price_feed: bool,
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pub expose_uptime: bool,
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pub stats_enabled: bool,
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pub stats_cache_hours: u64,
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}
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct RetentionConfig {
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pub login_events_days: u64,
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pub audit_days: u64,
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pub erasure_enabled: bool,
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pub purge_login_events: bool,
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pub export_per_day: u32,
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/// Grace window between a confirmed erasure and its execution.
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pub grace_period_hours: u64,
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}
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/// Wallet restore (import) policy — an OPERATOR decision, because the scan cost
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/// of a deep restore lands on *this* instance's LWS/node. Advertised via
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/// `/capabilities` (so the wallet adapts its import UX) and enforced at the scan
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/// path. Self-sovereignty is preserved at the ecosystem level: a user needing a
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/// deeper restore runs their own instance or picks a looser operator.
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum RestorePolicy {
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/// New-wallet registration only — the scan start must sit at (near) the tip.
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CreateOnly,
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/// Restore permitted up to `max_depth_days` behind the tip.
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Bounded,
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/// Any restore height accepted (the natural choice for self-hosting).
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Unlimited,
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}
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impl RestorePolicy {
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/// The wire token used in `/capabilities`.
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pub fn as_str(&self) -> &'static str {
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match self {
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RestorePolicy::CreateOnly => "create-only",
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RestorePolicy::Bounded => "bounded",
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RestorePolicy::Unlimited => "unlimited",
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}
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}
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
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pub struct RestoreConfig {
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pub policy: RestorePolicy,
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/// For `Bounded`: how many days behind the tip a restore may start.
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pub max_depth_days: u32,
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}
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/// Approximate blocks per day per chain (from target block time). Used only to
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/// turn the `max_depth_days` policy into a height floor — a soft operator bound,
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/// never a consensus value, so an approximation is fine.
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fn blocks_per_day(chain: &str) -> u64 {
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match chain {
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"xmr" | "wow" => 720, // ~120s target
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"grin" => 1440, // ~60s target
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"btc" => 144, // ~600s
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"ltc" => 576, // ~150s
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_ => 720,
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}
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}
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impl RestoreConfig {
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/// The earliest height this instance will scan from for `chain`, given the
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/// current `tip`. `0` means "no floor" (Unlimited).
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pub fn min_start_height(&self, chain: &str, tip: u64) -> u64 {
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let depth_days = match self.policy {
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RestorePolicy::Unlimited => return 0,
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// 1-day grace so a wallet "created today" still registers under
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// create-only without a tight tip race.
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RestorePolicy::CreateOnly => 1,
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RestorePolicy::Bounded => self.max_depth_days as u64,
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};
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tip.saturating_sub(depth_days.saturating_mul(blocks_per_day(chain)))
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}
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/// Enforce the policy for a requested `start_height` against the live `tip`.
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/// A too-deep restore is a `ValidationError` naming the bound — never the
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/// caller's value. Unlimited always passes.
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pub fn enforce(&self, chain: &str, start_height: u64, tip: u64) -> Result<(), AppError> {
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if self.policy == RestorePolicy::Unlimited
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|| start_height >= self.min_start_height(chain, tip)
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{
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return Ok(());
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}
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Err(match self.policy {
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RestorePolicy::CreateOnly => AppError::ValidationError(
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"this instance accepts new-wallet registration only (create-only); a restore \
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scan from an earlier height is not permitted here"
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.into(),
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),
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RestorePolicy::Bounded => AppError::ValidationError(format!(
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"restore depth exceeds this instance's limit of {} days",
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self.max_depth_days
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)),
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RestorePolicy::Unlimited => unreachable!(),
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})
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}
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}
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/// Registration gates beyond PoW — composable, operator-configured, advertised
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/// via `/capabilities`. Each is a gate the wallet must satisfy to create a NEW
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/// identity; returning wallets bypass them, and self-hosting bypasses all of
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/// them (run your own backend). PoW lives in [`PowConfig`]; this holds the rest.
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#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
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pub struct RegistrationConfig {
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/// Require a valid operator-minted invite code to register a new wallet.
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pub require_invite: bool,
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}
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impl Config {
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/// Load configuration from the environment and validate it (fail-closed).
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pub fn from_env() -> Result<Self, AppError> {
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let cfg = Self {
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server_host: env_or("SERVER_HOST", "0.0.0.0"),
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server_port: env_parse("SERVER_PORT", 8080u16)?,
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deployment_mode: match env_or("DEPLOYMENT_MODE", "single").to_lowercase().as_str() {
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"fleet" => DeploymentMode::Fleet,
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"single" => DeploymentMode::Single,
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other => {
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return Err(cfg_err(format!(
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"DEPLOYMENT_MODE must be single|fleet, got {other}"
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)))
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}
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},
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environment: env_or("ENVIRONMENT", "development"),
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database_url: env_opt("DATABASE_URL")
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.ok_or_else(|| cfg_err("DATABASE_URL is required"))?,
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|
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auth: AuthConfig {
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jwt_secret: env_or("JWT_SECRET", ""),
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jwt_expiry_hours: env_parse("JWT_EXPIRY_HOURS", 24u64)?,
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},
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identity: IdentityConfig {
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public_api_url: env_opt("PUBLIC_API_URL"),
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},
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secrets: SecretConfig {
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seed_fingerprint_pepper: env_or("SEED_FINGERPRINT_PEPPER", ""),
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refresh_token_pepper: env_or("REFRESH_TOKEN_PEPPER", ""),
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ip_salt: env_or("IP_SALT", ""),
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},
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trusted_proxies: parse_networks("TRUSTED_PROXIES")?,
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cors_allowed_origins: env_list("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS"),
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|
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features: FeatureFlags {
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chains: ChainFlags {
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btc: env_bool("FEATURE_BTC", true),
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ltc: env_bool("FEATURE_LTC", true),
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xmr: env_bool("FEATURE_XMR", true),
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wow: env_bool("FEATURE_WOW", true),
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grin: env_bool("FEATURE_GRIN", true),
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},
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prices: env_bool("FEATURE_PRICES", true),
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prices_provider: env_or("PRICES_PROVIDER", "coingecko").to_lowercase(),
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prices_interval_secs: env_parse("PRICES_FETCH_INTERVAL_SECS", 300u64)?,
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// Per-feed control. Distinguish UNSET from PRESENT-BUT-EMPTY:
|
|
// `env::var` (not `env_opt`, which collapses empty into None) so
|
|
// `PRICES_ASSETS=` means "none", not "all".
|
|
// unset => all supported feeds
|
|
// "btc,xmr" => that subset
|
|
// "" (or blanks) => none
|
|
prices_assets: match env::var("PRICES_ASSETS") {
|
|
Err(_) => SUPPORTED_PRICE_ASSETS
|
|
.iter()
|
|
.map(|s| s.to_string())
|
|
.collect(),
|
|
Ok(s) => s
|
|
.split(',')
|
|
.map(|x| x.trim().to_lowercase())
|
|
.filter(|x| !x.is_empty())
|
|
.collect(),
|
|
},
|
|
prices_currency: env_or("PRICES_CURRENCY", "usd").to_lowercase(),
|
|
tips: env_bool("FEATURE_TIPS", false),
|
|
nostr_identity: env_bool("FEATURE_NOSTR_IDENTITY", true),
|
|
grin_relay: env_bool("FEATURE_GRIN_RELAY", true),
|
|
},
|
|
chains: ChainConfig {
|
|
btc: UtxoConfig {
|
|
network: env_or("BTC_NETWORK", "mainnet"),
|
|
electrum_primary: env_opt("BTC_ELECTRUM_URL"),
|
|
electrum_fallbacks: env_list("BTC_ELECTRUM_FALLBACKS"),
|
|
},
|
|
ltc: UtxoConfig {
|
|
network: env_or("LTC_NETWORK", "mainnet"),
|
|
electrum_primary: env_opt("LTC_ELECTRUM_URL"),
|
|
electrum_fallbacks: env_list("LTC_ELECTRUM_FALLBACKS"),
|
|
},
|
|
xmr: LwsConfig {
|
|
lws_url: env_or("XMR_LWS_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:8443"),
|
|
lws_admin_url: env_or("XMR_LWS_ADMIN_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:9443"),
|
|
lws_admin_key: env_or("XMR_LWS_ADMIN_KEY", ""),
|
|
daemon_url: env_or("XMR_DAEMON_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18081"),
|
|
},
|
|
wow: LwsConfig {
|
|
lws_url: env_or("WOW_LWS_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:18443"),
|
|
lws_admin_url: env_or("WOW_LWS_ADMIN_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:19443"),
|
|
lws_admin_key: env_or("WOW_LWS_ADMIN_KEY", ""),
|
|
daemon_url: env_or("WOW_DAEMON_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:34568"),
|
|
},
|
|
grin: GrinConfig {
|
|
owner_api_url: env_or("GRIN_OWNER_API_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:3420/v3/owner"),
|
|
owner_api_secret: env_or("GRIN_OWNER_API_SECRET", ""),
|
|
wallet_password: env_or("GRIN_WALLET_PASSWORD", ""),
|
|
foreign_api_url: env_or(
|
|
"GRIN_FOREIGN_API_URL",
|
|
"http://127.0.0.1:3415/v2/foreign",
|
|
),
|
|
node_api_url: env_or("GRIN_NODE_API_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:3413/v2/owner"),
|
|
node_api_user: env_or("GRIN_NODE_API_USER", "grin"),
|
|
node_api_pass: env_or("GRIN_NODE_API_PASS", ""),
|
|
node_foreign_api_url: env_or(
|
|
"GRIN_NODE_FOREIGN_API_URL",
|
|
"http://127.0.0.1:3413/v2/foreign",
|
|
),
|
|
node_foreign_api_secret: env_or("GRIN_NODE_FOREIGN_API_SECRET", ""),
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
pow: PowConfig {
|
|
enabled: env_bool("FEATURE_POW", false),
|
|
hmac_key: env_or("ALTCHA_HMAC_KEY", ""),
|
|
required: env_bool("POW_REQUIRED", false),
|
|
cost: env_parse("ALTCHA_COST", 100_000u64)?,
|
|
required_for_pubkeys: env_list("TEST_POW_REQUIRED_FOR_PUBKEYS")
|
|
.into_iter()
|
|
.map(|s| s.to_lowercase())
|
|
.collect(),
|
|
},
|
|
admin: AdminConfig {
|
|
enabled: env_bool("ADMIN_ENABLED", false),
|
|
bind: env_or("ADMIN_BIND", "127.0.0.1:8081"),
|
|
public_url: env_or("ADMIN_PUBLIC_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:8081"),
|
|
jwt_secret: env_or("ADMIN_JWT_SECRET", ""),
|
|
key_integrity_secret: env_or("ADMIN_KEY_INTEGRITY_SECRET", ""),
|
|
pubkeys: env_list("ADMIN_PUBKEYS"),
|
|
max_keys: env_parse("ADMIN_MAX_KEYS", 8u32)?,
|
|
pending_key_ttl_days: env_parse("ADMIN_PENDING_KEY_TTL_DAYS", 7u32)?,
|
|
allow_public_bind: env_bool("ADMIN_ALLOW_PUBLIC_BIND", false),
|
|
onion: env_opt("TOR_ADMIN_ONION"),
|
|
},
|
|
landing: LandingConfig {
|
|
enabled: env_bool("PUBLIC_LANDING_ENABLED", false),
|
|
title: env_opt("PUBLIC_LANDING_TITLE"),
|
|
expose_version: env_bool("PUBLIC_EXPOSE_VERSION", false),
|
|
expose_chains: env_bool("PUBLIC_EXPOSE_CHAINS", false),
|
|
expose_price_feed: env_bool("PUBLIC_EXPOSE_PRICE_FEED", false),
|
|
expose_uptime: env_bool("PUBLIC_EXPOSE_UPTIME", false),
|
|
stats_enabled: env_bool("PUBLIC_STATS_ENABLED", false),
|
|
stats_cache_hours: env_parse("PUBLIC_STATS_CACHE_HOURS", 24u64)?,
|
|
},
|
|
retention: RetentionConfig {
|
|
login_events_days: env_parse("RETENTION_LOGIN_EVENTS_DAYS", 90u64)?,
|
|
audit_days: env_parse("RETENTION_AUDIT_DAYS", 365u64)?,
|
|
erasure_enabled: env_bool("ERASURE_ENABLED", false),
|
|
purge_login_events: env_bool("ERASURE_PURGE_LOGIN_EVENTS", true),
|
|
export_per_day: env_parse("ERASURE_EXPORT_PER_DAY", 3u32)?,
|
|
grace_period_hours: env_parse("ERASURE_GRACE_PERIOD_HOURS", 72u64)?,
|
|
},
|
|
restore: {
|
|
let policy = match env_or("WALLET_RESTORE_POLICY", "bounded")
|
|
.to_lowercase()
|
|
.as_str()
|
|
{
|
|
"create-only" | "create_only" | "createonly" => RestorePolicy::CreateOnly,
|
|
"bounded" => RestorePolicy::Bounded,
|
|
"unlimited" => RestorePolicy::Unlimited,
|
|
other => {
|
|
return Err(cfg_err(format!(
|
|
"WALLET_RESTORE_POLICY must be create-only|bounded|unlimited, got {other}"
|
|
)))
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
RestoreConfig {
|
|
policy,
|
|
max_depth_days: env_parse("WALLET_MAX_RESTORE_DEPTH_DAYS", 365u32)?,
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
registration: RegistrationConfig {
|
|
require_invite: env_bool("REGISTRATION_REQUIRE_INVITE", false),
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
cfg.validate()?;
|
|
Ok(cfg)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub fn is_production(&self) -> bool {
|
|
self.environment == "production"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Fail-closed validation. Returns `Err` (aborting startup) on any weak,
|
|
/// missing, or inconsistent security-relevant setting.
|
|
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), AppError> {
|
|
let prod = self.is_production();
|
|
|
|
// A secret that must be present, long enough, and (in prod) not a placeholder.
|
|
let require_secret = |name: &str, val: &str, min: usize| -> Result<(), AppError> {
|
|
if val.len() < min {
|
|
return Err(cfg_err(format!(
|
|
"{name} must be set and at least {min} bytes"
|
|
)));
|
|
}
|
|
if prod && looks_placeholder(val) {
|
|
return Err(cfg_err(format!(
|
|
"{name} looks like a placeholder; set a real value"
|
|
)));
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Core auth + identity secrets are always required.
|
|
require_secret("JWT_SECRET", &self.auth.jwt_secret, 32)?;
|
|
require_secret(
|
|
"SEED_FINGERPRINT_PEPPER",
|
|
&self.secrets.seed_fingerprint_pepper,
|
|
32,
|
|
)?;
|
|
require_secret(
|
|
"REFRESH_TOKEN_PEPPER",
|
|
&self.secrets.refresh_token_pepper,
|
|
32,
|
|
)?;
|
|
require_secret("IP_SALT", &self.secrets.ip_salt, 16)?;
|
|
|
|
// Restore policy: a Bounded policy needs a positive depth (0 would
|
|
// silently behave as create-only and muddy the capabilities contract).
|
|
if self.restore.policy == RestorePolicy::Bounded && self.restore.max_depth_days == 0 {
|
|
return Err(cfg_err(
|
|
"WALLET_MAX_RESTORE_DEPTH_DAYS must be > 0 when WALLET_RESTORE_POLICY=bounded",
|
|
));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Nostr identity: PUBLIC_API_URL must be a real absolute URL.
|
|
if self.features.nostr_identity {
|
|
let url = self.identity.public_api_url.as_deref().ok_or_else(|| {
|
|
cfg_err("PUBLIC_API_URL is required when FEATURE_NOSTR_IDENTITY is on")
|
|
})?;
|
|
let parsed = url::Url::parse(url)
|
|
.map_err(|_| cfg_err("PUBLIC_API_URL must be an absolute URL"))?;
|
|
if prod && parsed.scheme() != "https" {
|
|
return Err(cfg_err("PUBLIC_API_URL must be https in production"));
|
|
}
|
|
if prod && looks_placeholder(url) {
|
|
return Err(cfg_err(
|
|
"PUBLIC_API_URL looks like a placeholder; set your own domain",
|
|
));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// PoW gate: a real HMAC key when enabled (no source-visible fallback).
|
|
if self.pow.enabled {
|
|
require_secret("ALTCHA_HMAC_KEY", &self.pow.hmac_key, 32)?;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Admin surface: dedicated secrets + a real public URL when enabled.
|
|
if self.admin.enabled {
|
|
require_secret("ADMIN_JWT_SECRET", &self.admin.jwt_secret, 32)?;
|
|
require_secret(
|
|
"ADMIN_KEY_INTEGRITY_SECRET",
|
|
&self.admin.key_integrity_secret,
|
|
32,
|
|
)?;
|
|
url::Url::parse(&self.admin.public_url)
|
|
.map_err(|_| cfg_err("ADMIN_PUBLIC_URL must be an absolute URL"))?;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fleet mode cannot rely on in-process challenge state.
|
|
if self.deployment_mode == DeploymentMode::Fleet {
|
|
tracing::info!(
|
|
"deployment_mode=fleet: challenge/nonce state must be shared-store backed"
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Price feed: provider must be one we implement, and every configured
|
|
// asset must be one we can quote. Fail closed on a typo rather than
|
|
// booting a feed that can never populate (which would still advertise
|
|
// prices:true and silently serve nothing).
|
|
if self.features.prices {
|
|
if !matches!(self.features.prices_provider.as_str(), "coingecko") {
|
|
return Err(cfg_err(format!(
|
|
"PRICES_PROVIDER {:?} is not supported; supported: coingecko",
|
|
self.features.prices_provider
|
|
)));
|
|
}
|
|
for asset in &self.features.prices_assets {
|
|
if !SUPPORTED_PRICE_ASSETS.contains(&asset.as_str()) {
|
|
return Err(cfg_err(format!(
|
|
"PRICES_ASSETS contains unsupported asset {asset:?}; supported: {}",
|
|
SUPPORTED_PRICE_ASSETS.join(", ")
|
|
)));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !SUPPORTED_PRICE_CURRENCIES.contains(&self.features.prices_currency.as_str()) {
|
|
return Err(cfg_err(format!(
|
|
"PRICES_CURRENCY {:?} is not supported; supported: {}",
|
|
self.features.prices_currency,
|
|
SUPPORTED_PRICE_CURRENCIES.join(", ")
|
|
)));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Self-service erasure: its audit trail is the integrity-MAC'd hash chain,
|
|
// and its proofs bind PUBLIC_API_URL — both are required when it's on.
|
|
if self.retention.erasure_enabled {
|
|
require_secret(
|
|
"ADMIN_KEY_INTEGRITY_SECRET",
|
|
&self.admin.key_integrity_secret,
|
|
32,
|
|
)?;
|
|
if self.identity.public_api_url.is_none() {
|
|
return Err(cfg_err(
|
|
"PUBLIC_API_URL is required when ERASURE_ENABLED is on (it binds the signed-action proof)",
|
|
));
|
|
}
|
|
// Bound the grace window: a huge value panics Duration::hours and an
|
|
// overflow on the i64 cast could wrap negative (defeating grace).
|
|
if self.retention.grace_period_hours > 24 * 365 * 10 {
|
|
return Err(cfg_err(
|
|
"ERASURE_GRACE_PERIOD_HOURS must be <= 87600 (10 years)",
|
|
));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Per-enabled-chain infra config: hard error in production, warn in dev.
|
|
// This keeps /capabilities honest — an enabled chain that can't be served
|
|
// (no node/secret) must not boot in prod advertising itself as available.
|
|
let mut chain_warnings: Vec<&str> = Vec::new();
|
|
if self.features.chains.btc
|
|
&& self.chains.btc.electrum_primary.is_none()
|
|
&& self.chains.btc.electrum_fallbacks.is_empty()
|
|
{
|
|
chain_warnings.push("BTC_ELECTRUM_URL");
|
|
}
|
|
if self.features.chains.ltc
|
|
&& self.chains.ltc.electrum_primary.is_none()
|
|
&& self.chains.ltc.electrum_fallbacks.is_empty()
|
|
{
|
|
chain_warnings.push("LTC_ELECTRUM_URL");
|
|
}
|
|
if self.features.chains.xmr && self.chains.xmr.lws_admin_key.is_empty() {
|
|
chain_warnings.push("XMR_LWS_ADMIN_KEY");
|
|
}
|
|
if self.features.chains.wow && self.chains.wow.lws_admin_key.is_empty() {
|
|
chain_warnings.push("WOW_LWS_ADMIN_KEY");
|
|
}
|
|
if self.features.chains.grin && self.chains.grin.owner_api_secret.is_empty() {
|
|
chain_warnings.push("GRIN_OWNER_API_SECRET");
|
|
}
|
|
if !chain_warnings.is_empty() {
|
|
if prod {
|
|
return Err(cfg_err(format!(
|
|
"missing required config for enabled chains: {}",
|
|
chain_warnings.join(", ")
|
|
)));
|
|
}
|
|
for w in &chain_warnings {
|
|
tracing::warn!("{w} is unset — set this before enabling that chain in production");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
//! Fail-closed validation regression tests. `validate()` must reject weak
|
|
//! or inconsistent security settings rather than booting.
|
|
use super::*;
|
|
|
|
fn valid() -> Config {
|
|
let utxo = || UtxoConfig {
|
|
network: "mainnet".into(),
|
|
electrum_primary: None,
|
|
electrum_fallbacks: vec![],
|
|
};
|
|
let lws = || LwsConfig {
|
|
lws_url: String::new(),
|
|
lws_admin_url: String::new(),
|
|
lws_admin_key: String::new(),
|
|
daemon_url: String::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
Config {
|
|
server_host: "0.0.0.0".into(),
|
|
server_port: 8080,
|
|
deployment_mode: DeploymentMode::Single,
|
|
environment: "development".into(),
|
|
database_url: "postgres://localhost/smirk".into(),
|
|
auth: AuthConfig {
|
|
jwt_secret: "a".repeat(32),
|
|
jwt_expiry_hours: 24,
|
|
},
|
|
identity: IdentityConfig {
|
|
public_api_url: Some("https://backend.example.org/api/v1".into()),
|
|
},
|
|
secrets: SecretConfig {
|
|
seed_fingerprint_pepper: "p".repeat(32),
|
|
refresh_token_pepper: "r".repeat(32),
|
|
ip_salt: "s".repeat(16),
|
|
},
|
|
trusted_proxies: vec![],
|
|
cors_allowed_origins: vec![],
|
|
features: FeatureFlags {
|
|
chains: ChainFlags {
|
|
btc: false,
|
|
ltc: false,
|
|
xmr: false,
|
|
wow: false,
|
|
grin: false,
|
|
},
|
|
prices: false,
|
|
prices_provider: "coingecko".into(),
|
|
prices_interval_secs: 300,
|
|
prices_assets: vec!["btc".into(), "xmr".into()],
|
|
prices_currency: "usd".into(),
|
|
tips: false,
|
|
nostr_identity: true,
|
|
grin_relay: true,
|
|
},
|
|
chains: ChainConfig {
|
|
btc: utxo(),
|
|
ltc: utxo(),
|
|
xmr: lws(),
|
|
wow: lws(),
|
|
grin: GrinConfig {
|
|
owner_api_url: String::new(),
|
|
owner_api_secret: String::new(),
|
|
wallet_password: String::new(),
|
|
foreign_api_url: String::new(),
|
|
node_api_url: String::new(),
|
|
node_api_user: String::new(),
|
|
node_api_pass: String::new(),
|
|
node_foreign_api_url: String::new(),
|
|
node_foreign_api_secret: String::new(),
|
|
},
|
|
},
|
|
pow: PowConfig {
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
hmac_key: String::new(),
|
|
required: false,
|
|
cost: 100_000,
|
|
required_for_pubkeys: vec![],
|
|
},
|
|
admin: AdminConfig {
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
bind: "127.0.0.1:8081".into(),
|
|
public_url: "http://127.0.0.1:8081".into(),
|
|
jwt_secret: String::new(),
|
|
key_integrity_secret: String::new(),
|
|
pubkeys: vec![],
|
|
max_keys: 8,
|
|
pending_key_ttl_days: 7,
|
|
allow_public_bind: false,
|
|
onion: None,
|
|
},
|
|
landing: LandingConfig {
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
title: None,
|
|
expose_version: false,
|
|
expose_chains: false,
|
|
expose_price_feed: false,
|
|
expose_uptime: false,
|
|
stats_enabled: false,
|
|
stats_cache_hours: 24,
|
|
},
|
|
retention: RetentionConfig {
|
|
login_events_days: 90,
|
|
audit_days: 365,
|
|
erasure_enabled: false,
|
|
purge_login_events: true,
|
|
export_per_day: 3,
|
|
grace_period_hours: 72,
|
|
},
|
|
restore: RestoreConfig {
|
|
policy: RestorePolicy::Bounded,
|
|
max_depth_days: 365,
|
|
},
|
|
registration: RegistrationConfig {
|
|
require_invite: false,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn valid_config_passes() {
|
|
assert!(valid().validate().is_ok());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn short_jwt_secret_rejected() {
|
|
let mut c = valid();
|
|
c.auth.jwt_secret = "tooshort".into();
|
|
assert!(c.validate().is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn placeholder_jwt_rejected_in_production() {
|
|
let mut c = valid();
|
|
c.environment = "production".into();
|
|
c.auth.jwt_secret = "CHANGE_ME_CHANGE_ME_CHANGE_ME_1234".into();
|
|
assert!(c.validate().is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn nostr_requires_public_api_url() {
|
|
let mut c = valid();
|
|
c.identity.public_api_url = None;
|
|
assert!(c.validate().is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn missing_pepper_rejected() {
|
|
let mut c = valid();
|
|
c.secrets.seed_fingerprint_pepper.clear();
|
|
assert!(c.validate().is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn pow_enabled_requires_key() {
|
|
let mut c = valid();
|
|
c.pow.enabled = true;
|
|
assert!(c.validate().is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn enabled_chain_requires_secret_in_production() {
|
|
let mut c = valid();
|
|
c.environment = "production".into();
|
|
c.features.chains.xmr = true; // xmr.lws_admin_key is empty
|
|
assert!(c.validate().is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn unsupported_price_provider_rejected() {
|
|
let mut c = valid();
|
|
c.features.prices = true;
|
|
c.features.prices_provider = "binance".into();
|
|
assert!(c.validate().is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn unsupported_price_asset_rejected() {
|
|
let mut c = valid();
|
|
c.features.prices = true;
|
|
c.features.prices_assets = vec!["doge".into()];
|
|
assert!(c.validate().is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn disabled_prices_skips_provider_validation() {
|
|
let mut c = valid();
|
|
c.features.prices = false;
|
|
c.features.prices_provider = "binance".into();
|
|
assert!(c.validate().is_ok());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn unsupported_price_currency_rejected() {
|
|
let mut c = valid();
|
|
c.features.prices = true;
|
|
c.features.prices_currency = "usdd".into(); // typo
|
|
assert!(c.validate().is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn enabled_utxo_chain_without_electrum_rejected_in_production() {
|
|
let mut c = valid();
|
|
c.environment = "production".into();
|
|
c.features.chains.btc = true; // btc has no electrum_primary/fallbacks
|
|
assert!(c.validate().is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn restore_bounded_zero_depth_rejected() {
|
|
let mut c = valid();
|
|
c.restore = RestoreConfig {
|
|
policy: RestorePolicy::Bounded,
|
|
max_depth_days: 0,
|
|
};
|
|
assert!(c.validate().is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn restore_unlimited_accepts_any_height() {
|
|
let rc = RestoreConfig {
|
|
policy: RestorePolicy::Unlimited,
|
|
max_depth_days: 0,
|
|
};
|
|
assert!(rc.enforce("xmr", 1, 3_000_000).is_ok());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn restore_bounded_rejects_too_deep_accepts_within() {
|
|
let rc = RestoreConfig {
|
|
policy: RestorePolicy::Bounded,
|
|
max_depth_days: 30,
|
|
};
|
|
let tip = 3_000_000u64; // 30 days * 720 blocks/day => floor = tip - 21_600.
|
|
assert!(rc.enforce("xmr", tip - 21_600, tip).is_ok()); // exactly at the floor
|
|
assert!(rc.enforce("xmr", tip - 21_601, tip).is_err()); // one below the floor
|
|
assert!(rc.enforce("xmr", tip, tip).is_ok()); // create (at the tip)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn restore_create_only_rejects_old_allows_near_tip() {
|
|
let rc = RestoreConfig {
|
|
policy: RestorePolicy::CreateOnly,
|
|
max_depth_days: 365, // ignored under create-only
|
|
};
|
|
let tip = 3_000_000u64;
|
|
assert!(rc.enforce("xmr", tip, tip).is_ok()); // create
|
|
assert!(rc.enforce("xmr", tip - 720, tip).is_ok()); // within the 1-day grace
|
|
assert!(rc.enforce("xmr", tip - 100_000, tip).is_err()); // a real restore
|
|
}
|
|
}
|