Files
smirk-backend-core/tests/wallet_subaddr_provisioning.rs
jwinterm fb48e04ea6 feat(wallet): subaddress provisioning and batched UTXO endpoints (off by default)
Backend support for two address-privacy features. Both are behind env flags
that default to off, so an unconfigured instance behaves exactly as before:
the routes are not mounted and no provisioning is attempted.

FEATURE_XMR_SUBADDR_PROVISIONING
  Adds POST /wallet/lws/provision_subaddrs and provisions account-0 subaddress
  indices on the LWS at register/import.

  Three money-safety properties worth calling out:

  * The provisioned ceiling is read from the LWS response, never echoed back
    from the request. It is the contiguous run starting at minor 0, not
    max(hi): given ranges [[0,99],[200,299]], reporting 299 would let a wallet
    hand out indices 100..199 that the LWS never scans, so funds sent there
    would be invisible. No usable run is a hard error, not a guess.
  * import_account now always runs the backward rescan even when provisioning
    fails. Previously a provisioning error aborted first, leaving the account
    registered at the chain tip while every retry returned 200 OK, so a
    restoring wallet would show a zero balance permanently.
  * A capacity probe reads max_subaddresses from the LWS and refuses up front
    with a message naming the required --max-subaddresses value, rather than
    failing per-account later. The option defaults to 0 upstream.

  Spent outputs now carry their subaddress index. monero-lws emits this as
  `sender` (the index the spent output was received at), not `recipient`;
  without it a client recomputes a primary key image for a subaddress spend,
  treats the mismatch as a decoy, and never subtracts the amount.

FEATURE_UTXO_MULTI_ADDRESS
  Adds balance_multi / utxos_multi / history_multi for HD gap-limit wallets.
  Capped at 32 addresses, summed with checked_add, per-UTXO address tag
  preserved so the client never has to re-guess which key owns an output.
  Bounded concurrency with a per-batch deadline returning 504, so a slow
  Electrum server cannot stack n * IO_TIMEOUT.

Both flags are advertised in /capabilities so a client can negotiate instead
of calling routes that 404.
2026-07-28 16:01:25 -04:00

182 lines
6.1 KiB
Rust

//! L1 integration: the dark `FEATURE_XMR_SUBADDR_PROVISIONING` gate.
//!
//! Deterministic, no-network paths only: whether the route is mounted, and
//! whether `/capabilities` advertises the same answer the router enforces. The
//! networked happy path (a real LWS confirming a subaddress range) needs a live
//! gate and lives in the separate gitignored L3 harness.
//!
//! The flag is a process-wide environment variable, so these tests live in their
//! own binary (env is per-process) and take a lock around every set/restore.
mod common;
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use serde_json::json;
const FLAG: &str = "FEATURE_XMR_SUBADDR_PROVISIONING";
const ROUTE: &str = "/api/v1/wallet/lws/provision_subaddrs";
static ENV_LOCK: std::sync::Mutex<()> = std::sync::Mutex::new(());
/// Set the flag, run `body`, then restore the previous value. Held across the
/// whole test because `build_router` reads the flag when it mounts routes.
struct FlagGuard {
prev: Option<String>,
_lock: std::sync::MutexGuard<'static, ()>,
}
impl FlagGuard {
fn set(value: Option<&str>) -> Self {
let lock = ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
let prev = std::env::var(FLAG).ok();
match value {
Some(v) => std::env::set_var(FLAG, v),
None => std::env::remove_var(FLAG),
}
Self { prev, _lock: lock }
}
}
impl Drop for FlagGuard {
fn drop(&mut self) {
match self.prev.take() {
Some(v) => std::env::set_var(FLAG, v),
None => std::env::remove_var(FLAG),
}
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn provision_route_is_absent_while_the_flag_is_off() {
let _flag = FlagGuard::set(None);
let app = require_app!();
let (_uid, access, _r) = app.mint_session().await;
// Not mounted at all: an authenticated, well-formed request still 404s, so a
// client cannot reach the feature by guessing the path.
let (status, _) = app
.request(
"POST",
ROUTE,
Some(&access),
Some(json!({ "asset": "xmr", "address": "4Addr", "view_key": "00" })),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::NOT_FOUND);
// And the capability says so, so a client never has to probe.
let (status, body) = app.request("GET", "/api/v1/capabilities", None, None).await;
assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK);
assert_eq!(body["features"]["xmr_subaddr_provisioning"], json!(false));
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn provision_route_is_mounted_and_validates_while_the_flag_is_on() {
let _flag = FlagGuard::set(Some("1"));
let app = require_app!();
// Mounted: an unauthenticated request is rejected by the JWT gate (401),
// NOT by the router (404), which is what proves the route exists.
let (status, _) = app
.request(
"POST",
ROUTE,
None,
Some(json!({ "asset": "xmr", "address": "4Addr", "view_key": "00" })),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
let (_uid, access, _r) = app.mint_session().await;
// Authed but an unknown asset -> 400, still resolved before any LWS call.
let (status, body) = app
.request(
"POST",
ROUTE,
Some(&access),
Some(json!({ "asset": "doge", "address": "x", "view_key": "00" })),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
assert_eq!(body["code"], "VALIDATION_ERROR");
// A malformed view key is rejected before any LWS call too.
let (status, body) = app
.request(
"POST",
ROUTE,
Some(&access),
Some(json!({
"asset": "xmr",
"address": "4SomeAddress",
"view_key": "tooshort",
"max_minor": 31
})),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST);
assert_eq!(body["code"], "VALIDATION_ERROR");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn flag_parsing_agrees_between_the_router_and_capabilities() {
// Every accepted spelling must mount the route AND be advertised, so a
// client can negotiate instead of blindly calling a route that 404s.
for spelling in ["1", "true", "TRUE", "On", " yes "] {
let _flag = FlagGuard::set(Some(spelling));
let app = require_app!();
let (_uid, access, _r) = app.mint_session().await;
let (status, _) = app
.request(
"POST",
ROUTE,
Some(&access),
Some(json!({ "asset": "doge", "address": "x", "view_key": "00" })),
)
.await;
assert_ne!(
status,
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
"{spelling:?} should mount the route"
);
let (_s, body) = app.request("GET", "/api/v1/capabilities", None, None).await;
// Advertised only when a CryptoNote chain is actually serviceable; when
// it is not, the route may exist but the capability must stay false
// rather than promise a chain this instance cannot serve.
let advertised = body["features"]["xmr_subaddr_provisioning"] == json!(true);
let xmr_or_wow = body["chains"]["xmr"]["enabled"] == json!(true)
|| body["chains"]["wow"]["enabled"] == json!(true);
assert_eq!(advertised, xmr_or_wow, "{spelling:?}");
}
for spelling in ["0", "false", "off", "no", "", "maybe"] {
let _flag = FlagGuard::set(Some(spelling));
let app = require_app!();
let (_uid, access, _r) = app.mint_session().await;
let (status, _) = app
.request(
"POST",
ROUTE,
Some(&access),
Some(json!({ "asset": "xmr", "address": "4Addr", "view_key": "00" })),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(
status,
StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
"{spelling:?} must leave the feature dark"
);
let (_s, body) = app.request("GET", "/api/v1/capabilities", None, None).await;
assert_eq!(
body["features"]["xmr_subaddr_provisioning"],
json!(false),
"{spelling:?}"
);
}
}