Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jwinterm 4c83e53839 feat(config): effective config via ArcSwap + DB overlay at boot (Stage 2)
Wire the settings overlay into the live config path:
- AppState.config: Config -> Arc<ArcSwap<Config>> (hot-swappable effective config) +
  config_base: Arc<Config> (immutable env-only). New AppState::cfg() accessor; every
  config read goes through it (state.cfg().field), so a runtime-safe operator edit is
  seen on the next request. One Config type, no parallel path.
- Boot (main.rs): load_settings_overlay -> Config::apply_overlay(validate) -> build
  every client/worker/router from the EFFECTIVE config. A persisted overlay that no
  longer validates is ignored (boot env-only + loud log), never bricks. Env-only when
  ADMIN_KEY_INTEGRITY_SECRET is unset.
- Migrated ~59 state.config.X reads to state.cfg().X across api/*; bound guards where a
  reference outlives the statement; integrity_secret returns owned String.
- Test harness builds AppState with ArcSwap + config_base (arc-swap dev-dep).

Behavior-preserving: with no operator_settings rows, effective == env config.
cargo check --all-targets clean; lib tests 256/0.
2026-07-18 06:00:16 -04:00
jwinterm be23042c0c feat: core auth handlers (register, restore, pow, refresh, logout, me, nostr)
api/middleware.rs: Bearer access-token extraction; client_ip() trusts XFF only
behind config.trusted_proxies (fail-closed against spoofing).
api/auth.rs: extension_register (PoW-gated; derivation-rotation requires a
signature from the on-file key, no fingerprint hijack), check_restore (per-IP +
per-fingerprint rate limits, enumeration/timing-resistant), pow_challenge,
refresh_token (re-checks active session + revoke-then-issue rotation, race-safe),
logout, get_me, nostr_login (login-grade NIP-98, never creates a user, bound to
config public_api_url), nostr_link (JWT + state-change verify_signed_action,
fail-closed nonce stub) + DTOs + routes().
Wired into api/mod.rs + nested at /api/v1 in main.rs; all 8 paths registered in
ApiDoc so openapi.json covers the auth surface (was vacuous).

Drafted+hardened via draft->adversarial-review->revise workflow; independently
re-reviewed (no critical/high). 58 tests, all gates green.

Known LOW (tracked): concurrent first-registration of the same new pubkey_hash
can 500 instead of idempotent re-read; client-retryable.
2026-06-22 17:47:20 -04:00