Fixes every confirmed backend finding from the v0.3.0 pre-ship review.
Identity (the two that corrupt accounts):
- nostr_register creates a row with pubkey_hash NULL, so that wallet's later
/auth/extension call matched nothing, fell through the rotation path (which no
client ever satisfies, since nothing sends rotation_signature) and minted a
SECOND account. A fingerprint match on a NULL-pubkey_hash row now adopts the
submitted pubkey_hash onto that row, but only when the row's on-file BTC key
equals the submitted one, so a bare fingerprint (which check_restore discloses,
and is therefore not a secret) still cannot claim an account.
- The fingerprint-ownership check no longer short-circuits on returning_by_pubkey.
It was skipped for returning users, so a fingerprint owned by another row got
backfilled, violated the UNIQUE index, and 500'd that account on every
subsequent login.
- The rotation proof is verified over a distinct, instance- and target-bound
message. It shared the login message, so a captured login signature was a
replayable rotation proof against another instance.
Abuse control:
- The rate limiters key on the real client IP, honouring X-Forwarded-For only
from a trusted proxy. Behind the TLS terminator every request looked like
127.0.0.1, so the whole internet shared one bucket and ~3 req/s 429'd every
wallet unlock globally.
- A PoW solution is single-use instead of replayable for the challenge TTL.
- Delegated /verify is opt-in and rate-limited; it was an unauthenticated
amplifier into Electrum, LWS and a full-genesis grin scan.
- A grin scan with no start_height gets the same depth policy and PoW price as
one that passes a height, instead of an unbounded free scan.
Retention and logging:
- The retention sweep is implemented AND scheduled. RETENTION_* was advertised
and inert, which made the privacy policy's retention promise untrue. Zero
means keep forever, and each statement is batched so a backlog drains over
ticks rather than holding row locks.
- login_events.ip_hash is no longer written, and legacy values are scrubbed:
nothing ever read it, so it was retention without a purpose.
- Tracing spans log user_id only, not the raw npub and username.
- secret-scan.sh matches the coverage its comment claims.
Also fixes the test suite, which did not compile on this commit: NewSession
gained an id in c64cd9b and two call sites were never updated. mint_session now
binds one session_id for both the token and the row, since a different id there
would silently recreate the bug c64cd9b fixed.
- tools/secret-scan.sh now also flags nsec1 Nostr secret keys and
*_PEPPER/*_SALT/*INTEGRITY_SECRET hex assignments, the secret classes
this backend actually handles (previously only PEM/seed shapes).
- .gitignore: *.hex + admin-key* so an operator running inside the
checkout cannot commit the raw admin key (create-admin-wallet --out).
- PRIVACY.md pointing to the canonical smirk.cash/privacy, framed for
self-hosting operators as independent data controllers.
- minimal Axum server exposing GET /health
- OpenAPI contract generated from handlers (gen_openapi -> openapi.json),
drift-gated in CI so the spec can never silently diverge from the code
- CI: secret-scan + gitleaks, openapi drift gate, fmt/clippy/build/test/doc-test, cargo-deny
- Cargo.lock tracked for reproducible builds; publish=false; pinned toolchain
- README, SECURITY.md, deny.toml, .env.example
such-gitea
jw