fix(admin): create-admin-wallet fully bootstraps a fresh instance (latch + compose)

create-admin-wallet registered a pending admin key but never latched setup, so on
a fresh instance it left the bootstrap half-open and a later `setup` collided with
it (setup's guard only checked for an ACTIVE admin; the cli key was pending).

- New atomic Database::create_admin_key_bootstrapping: under the admin-keys
  advisory lock, insert the pending generated key AND latch `locked` (unless
  already validly locked), append audit, commit — one transaction. Fails CLOSED on
  a tampered latch (defers to reset-setup) instead of silently healing it.
- bootstrap_admin (setup) now refuses on ANY live admin key (active OR pending),
  not just active, so setup composes with create-admin-wallet. The adopt-existing-
  deployment path (users but no admin keys) is unaffected: no live key -> proceeds.
- reset_setup now takes the same advisory lock (all latch writers serialize) and
  documents the live-key recovery path.
- CLI prints bootstrapped-vs-added and a terminating lost-secret recovery hint.
- Docs (README + OPERATOR_SETUP section 5): both mutually-exclusive bootstrap paths.

Adversarially reviewed (atomicity / lockout / regression — all ship). L1 test
extended: fresh-latch, no-relatch-when-locked, pending semantics, composition
guard, and tamper-refuse (fails closed + rolls back the key insert).

README.md

@@ -83,10 +83,12 @@ inconsistent feature configuration rather than booting with a control silently
 defeated. Generate secrets with `openssl rand -hex 32`. See
 [`.env.example`](.env.example) for the full, documented configuration surface.
 
-First admin (headless bootstrap):
+First admin (headless bootstrap) — run **one** of these; both latch, so the
+other is refused afterward by design:
 
 ```sh
-smirk-admin setup --pubkey <x-only-hex>   # seed the first admin + latch the bootstrap
+smirk-admin setup --pubkey <x-only-hex>       # seed YOUR pubkey (active immediately)
+smirk-admin create-admin-wallet --out key.hex # generate a key (pending) + latch, no setup needed
 ```
 
 `<x-only-hex>` is the admin's Sign-in-with-Smirk (Nostr) public key; the admin

docs/operations/OPERATOR_SETUP.md

@@ -70,17 +70,31 @@ curl -s localhost:8080/api/v1/capabilities    # enabled chains, features, restor
 
 Admin functions — key management, erasure, tamper-evident audit — run on a
 separate loopback listener; the public API needs no admin. To enable it, set
-`ADMIN_ENABLED=true` and the two admin secrets, then bootstrap:
+`ADMIN_ENABLED=true` and the two admin secrets, then bootstrap with **one** of
+two mutually-exclusive first-run commands:
 
 ```sh
+# A) You already have a Sign-in-with-Smirk (Nostr) key — seed its pubkey (active now):
 smirk-admin setup --pubkey <x-only-hex>    # seed the first admin + latch the bootstrap
+
+# B) You want the CLI to generate a key — writes the secret 0600, registers it
+#    PENDING, and latches in one step (no `setup` needed):
+smirk-admin create-admin-wallet --out admin-key.hex
+
 smirk-admin doctor                         # database, live keys, audit chain
 ```
 
 `<x-only-hex>` is the admin's Sign-in-with-Smirk (Nostr) public key; the admin
-authenticates with the matching key over NIP-98. The bootstrap latch is
-MAC-protected and one-way — a live deployment is adopted as already-bootstrapped,
-and tampering fails closed.
+authenticates with the matching key over NIP-98. Both commands latch the
+bootstrap, so run **only one** — after either, the other is refused by design (a
+live admin key already exists). With (B) the generated key is *pending* and
+activates on the holder's first NIP-98 login; import `admin-key.hex` into your
+signer and log in. If you lose that secret before the first login, re-run
+`create-admin-wallet` (adds a fresh key) and `revoke-key` the stale one.
+
+The bootstrap latch is MAC-protected and one-way — a live deployment is adopted
+as already-bootstrapped, and tampering fails closed (the CLI and the boot path
+both refuse a tampered latch; run `reset-setup --i-understand` to re-open setup).
 
 Expose the admin plane over a Tor onion or an SSH tunnel; never bind it to a
 public interface. `ADMIN_BIND` defaults to loopback, and a non-loopback bind

src/bin/smirk-admin.rs

@@ -12,7 +12,10 @@
 //!   revoke-key         --id <uuid>            (may revoke the LAST key)
 //!   replace-key        --old <uuid> --pubkey <64hex> [--revoke-all]
 //!   create-admin-wallet --out <path>          (generates a key; writes the
-//!                                              secret 0600; registers the pubkey)
+//!                                              secret 0600; registers the pubkey
+//!                                              as pending; latches the bootstrap
+//!                                              on a fresh instance — a complete
+//!                                              first-run, no `setup` needed)
 //!   doctor
 //!
 //! Deferred (documented): remac-keys (integrity-secret rotation must also
@@ -43,7 +46,7 @@ COMMANDS:
     add-key             --pubkey <64hex> [--label <s>]
     revoke-key          --id <uuid>
     replace-key         --old <uuid> --pubkey <64hex> [--revoke-all]
-    create-admin-wallet --out <path>
+    create-admin-wallet --out <path>              (generate a key + bootstrap a fresh instance)
     mint-invite         [--count <n>] [--label <s>]  (registration invite codes)
     doctor
 ";
@@ -343,9 +346,11 @@ async fn create_admin_wallet(db: &Database, secret: &str, args: &[String]) -> Re
     secret_hex.zeroize();
     write_res.map_err(|e| format!("write secret to {out}: {e}"))?;
 
-    // Register the PUBLIC key only.
-    match db
-        .create_admin_key_audited(
+    // Register the PUBLIC key only (pending), and latch the bootstrap if this is a
+    // fresh instance — so `create-admin-wallet` alone fully bootstraps, atomically,
+    // rather than leaving setup half-open for a later `setup` to collide with.
+    let latched = match db
+        .create_admin_key_bootstrapping(
             NewAdminKey {
                 pubkey: pubkey.clone(),
                 label: Some("cli-generated".into()),
@@ -360,13 +365,23 @@ async fn create_admin_wallet(db: &Database, secret: &str, args: &[String]) -> Re
         .await
         .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
     {
-        AddKeyOutcome::Created(_) => {}
-        AddKeyOutcome::CapReached => return Err("unexpected: cap reached".into()),
-    }
+        (AddKeyOutcome::Created(_), latched) => latched,
+        (AddKeyOutcome::CapReached, _) => return Err("unexpected: cap reached".into()),
+    };
 
     println!("generated admin key; secret written to {out} (mode 0600)");
     println!("pubkey: {pubkey}");
+    if latched {
+        println!("fresh instance bootstrapped: setup latched (locked) — no `setup` needed");
+        println!("import the secret into your NIP-98 signer and log in to activate.");
+        println!(
+            "if you lose this secret before that first login, recover by re-running \
+             `create-admin-wallet` (adds a fresh key), then `revoke-key` the stale one"
+        );
+    } else {
+        println!("instance already bootstrapped: added a pending admin key");
         println!("import the secret into your NIP-98 signer; it activates on first login");
+    }
     Ok(())
 }
 

src/infra/db/admin_keys.rs

@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ impl Database {
 /// Insert a pending allowlist entry on `conn` (so it can share a caller's
 /// transaction). Computes the integrity MAC over the exact stored values. 409 if
 /// an active key with this pubkey already exists.
-async fn insert_admin_key(
+pub(crate) async fn insert_admin_key(
     conn: &mut PgConnection,
     input: &NewAdminKey,
     secret: &str,
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn admin_keys_mutate_lock(conn: &mut PgConnection) -> Result<()
 }
 
 /// Count live (non-revoked) keys on `conn` (so it reflects the locked tx).
-async fn live_key_count(conn: &mut PgConnection) -> Result<i64, AppError> {
+pub(crate) async fn live_key_count(conn: &mut PgConnection) -> Result<i64, AppError> {
     let n =
         sqlx::query_scalar::<_, i64>("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM admin_keys WHERE revoked_at IS NULL")
             .fetch_one(&mut *conn)

src/infra/db/server_config.rs

@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ use tracing::instrument;
 
 use crate::core::crypto::pepper::peppered_hex;
 use crate::error::AppError;
-use crate::models::db::{NewAdminAudit, ServerConfig};
+use crate::models::db::{NewAdminAudit, NewAdminKey, ServerConfig};
 
+use super::admin_keys::AddKeyOutcome;
 use super::Database;
 
 /// Resolved bootstrap state.
@@ -121,8 +122,12 @@ impl Database {
     }
 
     /// Headless bootstrap (CLI): insert the FIRST admin (active) and latch
-    /// `locked`, in ONE transaction + a hash-chained audit row. Refuses if an
-    /// active admin already exists (use `add-key` for more admins).
+    /// `locked`, in ONE transaction + a hash-chained audit row. Refuses if ANY
+    /// live admin key already exists — active OR pending — so `setup` composes
+    /// cleanly with `create-admin-wallet` (which registers a pending key + latches)
+    /// instead of seeding a confusing second admin. The adopt-existing-deployment
+    /// path is unaffected: a deployment with users but no admin keys has no live
+    /// key, so bootstrap still proceeds to seed the first admin.
     #[instrument(skip(self, secret))]
     pub async fn bootstrap_admin(&self, pubkey: &str, secret: &str) -> Result<(), AppError> {
         use crate::core::crypto::admin_mac::{compute_admin_key_mac, AdminKeyMacInput};
@@ -132,14 +137,16 @@ impl Database {
         super::admin_keys::admin_keys_mutate_lock(&mut tx).await?;
 
         let has_admin = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, bool>(
-            "SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM admin_keys WHERE revoked_at IS NULL AND activated_at IS NOT NULL)",
+            "SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM admin_keys WHERE revoked_at IS NULL)",
         )
         .fetch_one(&mut *tx)
         .await?;
         if has_admin {
             tx.rollback().await?;
             return Err(AppError::Conflict(
-                "an active admin already exists; use add-key".into(),
+                "an admin key already exists (active or pending); use add-key, or \
+                 create-admin-wallet to add another generated key"
+                    .into(),
             ));
         }
 
@@ -203,11 +210,110 @@ impl Database {
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    /// Register a generated PENDING admin key and, if the instance is not yet
+    /// bootstrapped, latch `locked` in the SAME transaction — so `create-admin-
+    /// wallet` on a fresh instance is a COMPLETE first-run bootstrap (key + latch),
+    /// not a key without a latch that leaves setup half-open (the bug this fixes).
+    /// Keeps pending semantics: the generated key activates on its holder's first
+    /// login (unlike `bootstrap_admin`, which seeds an already-active key from an
+    /// operator's own pubkey). On an already-locked instance this is a plain pending
+    /// add (no re-latch). FAILS CLOSED on a tampered latch (defers to `reset-setup`,
+    /// mirroring the boot path) rather than silently healing it. Serialized with all
+    /// admin-key mutations via the advisory lock, so it cannot race `bootstrap_admin`.
+    ///
+    /// Returns the add outcome and whether it latched (true = this call bootstrapped
+    /// a fresh instance). NOTE: `CapReached` returns `latched = false` WITHOUT
+    /// inserting or latching, so a caller passing a finite cap must treat that as
+    /// "instance still un-bootstrapped".
+    #[instrument(skip(self, input, audit, secret))]
+    pub async fn create_admin_key_bootstrapping(
+        &self,
+        input: NewAdminKey,
+        audit: &NewAdminAudit,
+        secret: &str,
+        max_live: i64,
+    ) -> Result<(AddKeyOutcome, bool), AppError> {
+        let mut tx = self.pool().begin().await?;
+        super::admin_keys::admin_keys_mutate_lock(&mut tx).await?;
+
+        // Resolve the latch state up front (under the lock). A missing row (Fresh)
+        // or a valid `uninitialized` row means "bootstrap now"; a valid `locked` row
+        // means "already bootstrapped, just add the key". A MAC-INVALID row is a
+        // tamper / restore-to-pre-bootstrap: FAIL CLOSED here exactly like the boot
+        // path, instead of silently re-stamping a valid `locked` latch over it and
+        // erasing the tamper evidence. The operator must acknowledge the recovery
+        // with `reset-setup --i-understand` first.
+        let cfg = sqlx::query_as::<_, ServerConfig>(
+            "SELECT id, setup_state, bootstrap_completed_at, locked_at, updated_at, integrity_mac \
+             FROM server_config WHERE id = 1",
+        )
+        .fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
+        .await?;
+        if matches!(&cfg, Some(c) if !verify_latch(secret, c)) {
+            tx.rollback().await?;
+            return Err(AppError::Conflict(
+                "server_config bootstrap latch MAC invalid (tamper or restore-to-pre-bootstrap); \
+                 run `reset-setup --i-understand` first if this is intentional"
+                    .into(),
+            ));
+        }
+        // Past the tamper gate, a present row is MAC-valid, so this is genuinely
+        // "already locked" only for a real `locked` state.
+        let already_locked = matches!(&cfg, Some(c) if c.setup_state == "locked");
+
+        // Cap check under the lock (the CLI passes i64::MAX — effectively no cap).
+        let live = super::admin_keys::live_key_count(&mut tx).await?;
+        if live >= max_live {
+            tx.rollback().await?;
+            return Ok((AddKeyOutcome::CapReached, false));
+        }
+
+        let key = super::admin_keys::insert_admin_key(&mut tx, &input, secret).await?;
+
+        // Latch `locked` unless already validly locked (so additional generated keys
+        // do not re-stamp bootstrap_completed_at). INVARIANT: latching with only a
+        // PENDING key (zero active admins) is safe ONLY because no runtime path gates
+        // on `setup_state` — admin login authorizes on a pending key and activates it
+        // on first use (see api/admin.rs). Do NOT add a "reject unless Locked && >=1
+        // active admin" gate: it would make this state an unrecoverable lockout (the
+        // login that would activate the key is the one such a gate would block).
+        let latched = if already_locked {
+            false
+        } else {
+            let now = Utc::now().trunc_subsecs(6);
+            let latch = latch_mac(secret, "locked", Some(now.timestamp_micros()));
+            sqlx::query(
+                "INSERT INTO server_config (id, setup_state, bootstrap_completed_at, locked_at, integrity_mac) \
+                 VALUES (1, 'locked', $1, $1, $2) \
+                 ON CONFLICT (id) DO UPDATE SET setup_state = 'locked', \
+                    bootstrap_completed_at = $1, locked_at = $1, updated_at = NOW(), integrity_mac = $2",
+            )
+            .bind(now)
+            .bind(&latch)
+            .execute(&mut *tx)
+            .await?;
+            true
+        };
+
+        self.append_admin_audit(&mut tx, audit, secret).await?;
+        tx.commit().await?;
+        Ok((AddKeyOutcome::Created(key), latched))
+    }
+
     /// Reset the latch to `uninitialized` (shell `reset-setup` only). Recomputes
     /// the MAC so it verifies again; existing admin keys are left untouched, so
-    /// recovery cannot worsen a lockout.
+    /// recovery cannot worsen a lockout. Takes the admin-keys advisory lock so all
+    /// latch writers (`bootstrap_admin`, `create_admin_key_bootstrapping`) serialize
+    /// on one lock — a concurrent reset can't tear a check-then-latch.
+    ///
+    /// Recovery note: keys are preserved, so if a LIVE key still exists after the
+    /// reset, `setup` stays refused (its guard rejects any live key). Recover by
+    /// re-running `create-admin-wallet` (adds a fresh key + re-latches), or by
+    /// `revoke-key`-ing the stale key(s) and then running `setup`.
     #[instrument(skip(self, secret))]
     pub async fn reset_setup(&self, secret: &str) -> Result<(), AppError> {
+        let mut tx = self.pool().begin().await?;
+        super::admin_keys::admin_keys_mutate_lock(&mut tx).await?;
         let mac = latch_mac(secret, "uninitialized", None);
         sqlx::query(
             "INSERT INTO server_config (id, setup_state, bootstrap_completed_at, locked_at, integrity_mac) \
@@ -216,8 +322,9 @@ impl Database {
                 bootstrap_completed_at = NULL, locked_at = NULL, updated_at = NOW(), integrity_mac = $1",
         )
         .bind(&mac)
-        .execute(self.pool())
+        .execute(&mut *tx)
         .await?;
+        tx.commit().await?;
         Ok(())
     }
 }

tests/server_config.rs

@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
 
 mod common;
 
-use smirk_backend_core::infra::db::SetupState;
-use smirk_backend_core::models::db::NewAdminKey;
+use smirk_backend_core::infra::db::{AddKeyOutcome, SetupState};
+use smirk_backend_core::models::db::{NewAdminAudit, NewAdminKey};
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
 const SECRET: &str = "server-config-integrity-secret-0123456789ab";
@@ -84,4 +84,156 @@ async fn latch_state_machine_and_tamper_detection() {
         "bootstrap refused while an active admin exists"
     );
     let _ = db.revoke_admin_key(k.id, SECRET).await;
+
+    // ── create_admin_key_bootstrapping: a generated-key first-run (fix B) ──────
+    // `create-admin-wallet` on a FRESH instance must be a COMPLETE bootstrap:
+    // register the (pending) generated key AND latch `locked`, atomically.
+    sqlx::query("DELETE FROM server_config WHERE id = 1")
+        .execute(db.pool())
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        db.read_setup_state(SECRET).await.unwrap(),
+        SetupState::Fresh
+    );
+
+    let genpk = format!("{:0>64}", Uuid::new_v4().simple());
+    let audit = NewAdminAudit {
+        action: "admin_wallet_created".into(),
+        actor_kind: "cli".into(),
+        actor_pubkey_prefix: None,
+        target: Some(genpk.clone()),
+        details: None,
+        ip_address: None,
+    };
+    let (outcome, latched) = db
+        .create_admin_key_bootstrapping(
+            NewAdminKey {
+                pubkey: genpk.clone(),
+                label: Some("cli-generated".into()),
+                scope: "admin".into(),
+                created_by_kind: "cli".into(),
+                activation_deadline: None,
+            },
+            &audit,
+            SECRET,
+            i64::MAX,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        latched,
+        "a fresh instance is latched by create-admin-wallet"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        db.read_setup_state(SECRET).await.unwrap(),
+        SetupState::Locked,
+        "the generated-key bootstrap latches locked"
+    );
+    let key1 = match outcome {
+        AddKeyOutcome::Created(k) => k,
+        AddKeyOutcome::CapReached => panic!("unexpected cap"),
+    };
+    assert!(
+        key1.activated_at.is_none(),
+        "the generated key stays pending (activates on first login)"
+    );
+
+    // A SECOND generated key on the now-locked instance is a plain pending add —
+    // it must NOT re-latch (no re-stamping bootstrap_completed_at).
+    let genpk2 = format!("{:0>64}", Uuid::new_v4().simple());
+    let audit2 = NewAdminAudit {
+        target: Some(genpk2.clone()),
+        ..audit.clone()
+    };
+    let (outcome2, latched2) = db
+        .create_admin_key_bootstrapping(
+            NewAdminKey {
+                pubkey: genpk2.clone(),
+                label: Some("cli-generated".into()),
+                scope: "admin".into(),
+                created_by_kind: "cli".into(),
+                activation_deadline: None,
+            },
+            &audit2,
+            SECRET,
+            i64::MAX,
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert!(!latched2, "an already-locked instance is not re-latched");
+    assert_eq!(
+        db.read_setup_state(SECRET).await.unwrap(),
+        SetupState::Locked
+    );
+    let key2 = match outcome2 {
+        AddKeyOutcome::Created(k) => k,
+        AddKeyOutcome::CapReached => panic!("unexpected cap"),
+    };
+
+    // Composition guard: with a live (even PENDING) key present, `setup` refuses
+    // rather than seeding a confusing second admin. NOTE: on the shared test DB this
+    // assertion is non-discriminating — sibling test binaries leave ACTIVE keys, so
+    // it would pass under the old active-only guard too. The any-live widen is proven
+    // hermetically at the query level in the db unit tests; here it documents intent.
+    assert!(
+        db.bootstrap_admin(&"22".repeat(32), SECRET).await.is_err(),
+        "setup refuses once any live admin key exists (even pending)"
+    );
+
+    // create-admin-wallet FAILS CLOSED on a tampered latch (defers to reset-setup),
+    // rather than silently re-stamping a valid `locked` latch over the tamper. We own
+    // the singleton, so this is isolable: raw-flip the state without recomputing the
+    // MAC (the restore-to-pre-bootstrap shape), then assert the call errors, the latch
+    // is NOT healed, and the key insert was rolled back.
+    sqlx::query(
+        "UPDATE server_config SET setup_state = 'uninitialized', bootstrap_completed_at = NULL WHERE id = 1",
+    )
+    .execute(db.pool())
+    .await
+    .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        db.read_setup_state(SECRET).await.unwrap(),
+        SetupState::Tampered
+    );
+    let genpk3 = format!("{:0>64}", Uuid::new_v4().simple());
+    let audit3 = NewAdminAudit {
+        target: Some(genpk3.clone()),
+        ..audit.clone()
+    };
+    let tampered_res = db
+        .create_admin_key_bootstrapping(
+            NewAdminKey {
+                pubkey: genpk3.clone(),
+                label: Some("cli-generated".into()),
+                scope: "admin".into(),
+                created_by_kind: "cli".into(),
+                activation_deadline: None,
+            },
+            &audit3,
+            SECRET,
+            i64::MAX,
+        )
+        .await;
+    assert!(
+        tampered_res.is_err(),
+        "create-admin-wallet fails closed on a tampered latch"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(
+        db.read_setup_state(SECRET).await.unwrap(),
+        SetupState::Tampered,
+        "the tampered latch is NOT silently healed"
+    );
+    let keys = db.list_admin_keys().await.unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        !keys.iter().any(|k| k.pubkey == genpk3),
+        "the refused call rolled back its pending key insert"
+    );
+
+    let _ = db.revoke_admin_key(key1.id, SECRET).await;
+    let _ = db.revoke_admin_key(key2.id, SECRET).await;
+
+    // Leave the owned singleton in a clean, MAC-valid state (not raw-tampered) for
+    // the next run / any reader.
+    db.reset_setup(SECRET).await.unwrap();
 }