mirror of
https://github.com/Such-Software/hash-wallet.git
synced 2026-10-17 05:41:29 +02:00
jwinterm
c1f618176c
Three desktop targets, three different states, one destination. macOS did not build at all. There was no workflow, only Cake's from-source scripts and an Xcode project. It turns out most of the work was already done: monero_c ships aarch64-apple-darwin and x86_64-apple-darwin, and Runner.xcodeproj already references both dylibs with CodeSignOnCopy. So this fetches the same prebuilt bundle the iOS and Android legs use, lipos the two slices into universal libraries, and builds. One download serves Apple Silicon and Intel, because a single-arch build looks correct on the machine that made it and fails on half of everyone else's. It signs with a Developer ID Application certificate, which is NOT the Apple Distribution certificate the TestFlight workflow uses. They are not interchangeable: an App Store cert on a directly downloaded app is refused by Gatekeeper. Signing is inside-out by hand rather than --deep, which Apple deprecated and which skips nested code it does not recognise. Then notarytool with the App Store Connect key this repository already has, then stapler, so Gatekeeper clears the app without a network round trip. Every credential is optional and the preflight says, before spending forty minutes, exactly which stages the run can reach and what the user will see if it cannot reach them. Absent secrets downgrade the build loudly; they do not fail it and they do not pass silently. Windows and Linux already built. Windows already Authenticode-signs through the Fleet broker. What both lacked was a way to get the artifact to anybody: upload-artifact is the only publication and Gitea Actions artifacts here upload and then list as zero, so the signed Windows zip has never been reachable. Both now publish to the GitHub release, on the smirk pattern: tag-triggered, the release must already exist so a half-populated one never goes public, and a same-named asset from an earlier attempt is replaced rather than duplicated. Windows does its API work in PowerShell because git-bash there has neither python nor node guaranteed and ConvertFrom-Json is native. Tags now build automatically on all three. A tag is the thing a release is cut from, and the artifact that gets signed should come from it rather than from whatever was dispatched by hand. scripts/release/sign-release.sh detach-signs the collected artifacts and signs SHA256SUMS, which is the signature that matters when a download reaches someone from a mirror without its .asc. It verifies even immediately after signing: a signature written but never checked invites trust it has not earned. Not done here, and both need a human: GH_RELEASE_TOKEN does not exist in this repository's Gitea secrets, and the release key's user ID still says Smirk.
100 lines
3.4 KiB
Bash
Executable File
100 lines
3.4 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# sign-release.sh: detach-sign every shipped desktop artifact, and verify.
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#
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# Same shape as smirk's, deliberately: one person verifies downloads from both
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# products and should not have to learn two procedures.
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#
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# windows : HashBags-windows-<tag>.zip
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# macos : HashBags-macos-<version>.zip
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# linux : Hash_Bags-x86_64.AppImage
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#
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# Each artifact gets a detached ASCII signature beside it (<file>.asc), and
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# SHA256SUMS is written and signed too. Signing the sums file is the one that
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# matters most: it is what lets someone verify a download that reached them
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# from a mirror or a store page, where the .asc never travelled with the file.
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#
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# Usage:
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# scripts/release/sign-release.sh 1.0.3 --dir ~/release-1.0.3
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# scripts/release/sign-release.sh 1.0.3 --dir ~/release-1.0.3 --verify
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# HASHBAGS_SIGNING_KEY=<keyid!> scripts/release/sign-release.sh 1.0.3 --dir ...
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#
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# HASHBAGS_SIGNING_KEY should name the RELEASE SIGNING SUBKEY, not the primary,
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# and should carry a trailing exclamation mark so gpg uses exactly that subkey
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# rather than choosing one itself. The primary never needs to be present on a
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# build machine, and is not needed here.
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set -euo pipefail
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fail() { echo "sign-release: $1" >&2; exit 1; }
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VERSION="${1:-}"
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if [ -z "$VERSION" ] || [ "$VERSION" = "-h" ] || [ "$VERSION" = "--help" ]; then
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sed -n '2,27p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'
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exit 2
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fi
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shift
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DIR=""
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VERIFY_ONLY=0
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while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
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case "$1" in
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--dir) DIR="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
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--verify) VERIFY_ONLY=1; shift ;;
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*) fail "unknown argument: $1" ;;
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esac
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done
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[ -n "$DIR" ] || fail "no --dir. Where are the downloaded artifacts?"
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[ -d "$DIR" ] || fail "no such directory: $DIR"
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# The company release key. One key covers Hash Bags and Smirk, which is a
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# deliberate choice: the fingerprint a user is asked to trust belongs to Such
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# Software rather than to a product, so it does not have to be re-learned per
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# app. The cost is that rotating it affects everything, which is why the
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# primary stays offline and only this subkey signs.
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KEY="${HASHBAGS_SIGNING_KEY:-96F6836D5110C2CB!}"
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command -v gpg >/dev/null || fail "gpg is not installed"
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cd "$DIR"
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shopt -s nullglob
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FILES=( HashBags-windows-*.zip HashBags-macos-*.zip Hash_Bags-*.AppImage *.dmg *.deb )
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[ ${#FILES[@]} -gt 0 ] || fail "no release artifacts found in $DIR"
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echo "artifacts in $DIR:"
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printf ' %s\n' "${FILES[@]}"
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echo
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if [ "$VERIFY_ONLY" -eq 0 ]; then
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# SHA256SUMS first, so the signature covers the final set rather than a set
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# that grew afterwards.
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: > SHA256SUMS
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for f in "${FILES[@]}"; do
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if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null; then sha256sum "$f" >> SHA256SUMS
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else shasum -a 256 "$f" >> SHA256SUMS; fi
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done
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cat SHA256SUMS
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echo
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for f in "${FILES[@]}" SHA256SUMS; do
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rm -f "$f.asc"
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gpg --local-user "$KEY" --armor --detach-sign --output "$f.asc" "$f"
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echo "signed $f"
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done
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echo
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fi
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# Verify unconditionally, including right after signing. A signature that was
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# written but cannot be checked is worth less than none, because it invites
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# trust it has not earned.
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rc=0
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for f in "${FILES[@]}" SHA256SUMS; do
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[ -f "$f.asc" ] || { echo "MISSING SIGNATURE: $f.asc"; rc=1; continue; }
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if gpg --verify "$f.asc" "$f" 2>/dev/null; then
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echo "verified $f"
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else
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echo "VERIFY FAILED: $f"; rc=1
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fi
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done
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[ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail "one or more artifacts did not verify"
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echo
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echo "all artifacts signed and verified for $VERSION"
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